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Concealing Legislative Reform in
the Common-Law Tradition: The
Advancements Doctrine and the
Uniform Probate Code
Mary Louise Fellows*
The most fundamental change in American law in this century
is the growing reliance on legislation to solve social and economic
problems.1 Not surprisingly, with statutory enactments growing in
importance as the source of the law, the legislative process itself
has attracted the interest of many scholars.2 This essay intends to
contribute to this growing body of literature by exploring the phe-
nomenon of lawmakers using judicial decision-making techniques
when designing statutory enactments. Judges frequently conceal
their decisions to move beyond or retreat from existing law by ra-
tionalizing their holdings with prior decisions or statutes. Courts
feel obligated to bow to precedent and statutory rules because of
notions about American democracy and the doctrine of separation
of powers, and because of the myth that the role of a judge in the
common-law process is that of lawfinder and not of lawmaker.3
Legislatures' engagement in similar pretexts, however, is not so
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1. See generally G. CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982)(trac-
ing the history and role of American statutory law); G. GIuMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAw (1977) (discussing the evolution of American law since the early 1800's).
2. See, e.g., S. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCITIES (1968); M. JEw-
ELL, THE STATE LEGISLATURE POLITICS AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1969); M. JEWELL & S. PATTER-
SON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1977); J. VAN DER SLss, AMER-
ICAN, LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES (1977); Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1965);
Elliott, The Lawyer and Legislation, 26 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 359 (1954); Krasnow & Kurz-
man, Lawyers for the Lawmakers, 51 A.B.A. J. 1191 (1965); Pound, Common Law and Leg-
iulation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
3. For an excellent discussion of the legitimacy of courts' lawmaking power, see G.
CALABREsI, supra note 1, at 91-101.
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readily explicable. This essay explores the adoption by statutory
drafters of judicial subterfuge techniques that formally retain an
existing legal rule while drastically changing its practical effect.
The "legislative study" chosen to demonstrate this statutory sub-
terfuge technique is the doctrine of advancements of intestate suc-
cession shares. By investigating the development of this area of
law, this essay demonstrates the costs and benefits of employing
subterfuge techniques in statutory enactments and concludes that
such drafting techniques are seldom justifiable.
This essay first sets forth the doctrine of advancements and
includes a discussion of its suitability for a study of statutory re-
form and the purpose and origin of the doctrine. The essay then
demonstrates how a presumption against finding an advancement
that can be rebutted only by a writing showing a contrary intent
operates as a practical repeal of advancements. Next, the essay ex-
plores the rationales of the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC) in repealing the advancements doctrine by subterfuge and
analyzes the costs of reform by subterfuge. Finally, the essay rec-
ommends an alternative approach to reforming the advancements
doctrine, which offers some insights into avoiding statutory
subterfuge.
An advancement is a gift made by a decedent during life to a
family member that reduces the share of the probate estate that
the family member receives under the intestate succession statute
upon the decedent's death.4 For example, the advancements doc-
trine provides that in the distribution of an estate of a father who
dies without a will and who made a prior gift of $100,000 to one of
his three surviving sons, the other two sons receive $100,000 from
their father's estate before the third son receives any further prop-
erty. This doctrine, codified in UPC section 2-110, has much to
recommend it as a proper subject for a study of the legislative pro-
cess. First, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws scrutinized the doctrine. The American Bar Associa-
tion established the Conference in 18891 as a model for assuring
4. See West v. Beck, 95 Iowa 520, 64 N.W. 599 (1895); Nobles v. Davenport, 185 N.C.
162, 116 S.E. 407 (1923), 183 N.C. 207, 111 S.E. 180 (1922); Cazassa v. Cazassa, 92 Tenn.
573, 22 S.W. 560 (1893); W. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO GIrs AND
ADVANCEMENTS 503-05, 510-11 (1893); Elbert, Advancements: I, 51 MICH. L. REV. 665, 665,
675-78 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Elbert, Advancements: 1]; Elbert, Advancements: II, 52
MICH. L. REV. 231 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Elbert, Advancements: II]; Elbert, Advance-
ments: III, 52 MICH. L. REv. 535 (1954).
5. REPORT op THE AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, 12TH ANNUAL MEETING 50-51 (1889).
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good lawmaking. The promulgation of a uniform law represents the
culmination of years of scholarly work. Although interested per-
sons are given a full opportunity to express their views, the draft-
ers act independently of any group. Preliminary drafts of model
laws receive careful, critical review, which further increases the
likelihood that the final promulgation contains no inconsistencies,
ambiguities, or unthoughtful changes.6 Thus, any criticism of UPC
section 2-110 cannot be attributed to the lawmakers' haste, care-
lessness, or inexpertise that frequently explains troubling statutory
provisions.
Second, the advancements doctrine is a good subject for study
because it is perfectly innocuous. The goals of legislation in the
area of succession are nondebatable-drafters should design legal
rules to achieve the donative intent of individual decedents, but
not to require litigation for resolving the issue of intent. A rule of
law that permits specific factual inquiry into donative intent will
necessitate admitting evidence that is particularly susceptible to
misinterpretation and fraudulent manufacture. The poor quality of
evidence used to prove intent not only increases the likelihood of
litigation, but also may undermine the goal of furthering donative
intent.7 In addition to the noncontroversial nature of the goals of
advancements legislation, no political group or particular school of
legal thought is identified with the various choices for reform in
this area. Disputes arise only because of differences of opinion on
how to balance these two, sometimes inconsistent, goals. A rule of
law that purports to reflect a decedent's probable intent is a wel-
comed reform, but scholars generally view this type of reform cau-
tiously because of a fear that donative intent is being sacrificed for
the sake of administrative convenience. In sum, the UPC treat-
ment of the advancements doctrine is an excellent choice for the
study of statutory reform because it provides an opportunity to
6. See Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. Rzv. 401,
424 (1968) (identifying similar criteria to explain the Uniform Commercial Code's success);
see also Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 142, 146-48 (1920) (urging
establishment of a group that would have the responsibility of analyzing the laws and pro-
posing reforms.
7. See generally Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE
L.J. 1 (1941) (describing the various functions served by will formalities); Langbein, Sub-
stantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARy. L. Rzv. 489 (1975)(suggesting that the
courts' insistence regarding execution of wills should be replaced with a substantial com-
pliance doctrine); Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake:
Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 521 (1982) (suggesting that
courts should admit evidence of the testator's intent and reform wills containing mistakes).
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evaluate lawmaking when erratic influences on the process have
been minimized and the likelihood for rational results has been
enhanced.
An intestate succession statute is a statutory estate plan
designed, in a large part, to reflect the probable intent of an indi-
vidual who dies without leaving a will." Every American intestacy
statute contains a distribution pattern that assures equal treat-
ment among the decedent's children." The primary purpose of the
advancements doctrine, and the reason for its inclusion in the stat-
utory distribution pattern, is to further this equality principle.10
8. Averill, Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship and Trusts: A Com-
parison with the Uniform Probate Code-Part 1, 7 LAND & WATR L. REV. 169, 176 (1972);
Curry, Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of Article 11 of the Uni-
form Probate Code and the Law of Ohio, 34 Omo ST. L.J. 114, 116 (1973); Fratcher, Toward
Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1037, 1047 (1966); Mulder, Intestate
Succession Under the Uniform Probate Code, 3 PaosPzcrus 301, 301, 306 (1970); O'Connell
& Effland, Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of the Law of Arizona
and the Uniform Probate Code, 14 ARiz. L. Rav. 205, 209 (1972).
Intestate succession statutes also reflect societal interests including the protection of
the decedent's financially dependent family, the avoidance of complex property titles and
excessive subdivision of property, and the promotion and encouragement of the nuclear
family. See 7 R. PoWELL, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY 1 991-993 (R. Rohan rev. ed. 1982);
Cole, Inheritance, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 35, 36 (1932); Friedman, The
Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY ESSAYS
AND AmiCAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 14 (E. Halbach, Jr. ed. 1977). To the extent these societal
interests conflict with the preferences of individual citizens, the societal interests should
prevail. See L. SIss, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 21 (1955); see also Friedman, The
Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 WIs. L.
Rav. 340, 355-57. Actually, little, if any, conflict exists between an individual decedent's
preferences and societal interests. See generally Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Attitudes
About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United
States, 1978 AM. B. FoUND. RESEARCH J. 319.
9. See Page, Descent Per Stirpes and Per Capita, 1946 WIs. L. Rav. 3, 11-12, 23-27,
36-37, for a description of the historical development of the law pertaining to children's
shares under the intestate succession statutes.
10. See Nobles v. Davenport, 185 N.C. 162, 116 S.E. 407 (1923), 183 N.C. 207, 111 S.E.
180 (1922); In re Blockley, 29 Ch. D. 250 (1885); Boyd v. Boyd, 4 L.R.-Eq. 305 (1867); Ed-
wards v. Freeman, 2 P. Wins. 435, 24 Eng. Rep. 803 (1727); see also W. THORNTON, supra
note 4, at 508-09.
The model for the American advancements statute was the English Statute of Distribu-
tion, 22 & 23 Car. II, ch. 10, § 3 (1670), which limited the doctrine to gifts made by a father
to his children. All American statutes have extended the doctrine to mothers, and most have
expanded the class of eligible advancees to lineal descendants, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §
45-274(a) (1983); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 196, § 3 (West 1958); VA. CODE § 64.1-17 (1980),
or to heirs, including decendent's ancestors, collaterals, and spouse, see, e.g., ALA. CODE §
43-8-49 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-153 (1971); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-106
(1974). Tennessee is the only state that appears to continue to limit the doctrine to children.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 31-701 to -702 (1977). The language in this statute is ambiguous. In all
reported cases, the advancements concerned a transfer from a parent to a child, see, e.g.,
Anderson v. Forbes, 169 Tenn. 223, 84 S.W.2d 104 (1935); Cawthon v. Coppedge, 31 Tenn.
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By taking into account lifetime parental gifts to children, the ad-
vancements doctrine achieves a more equal sharing by the children
of their parent's wealth when the parent dies without a will." The
(1 Swan) 486 (1852); Thornton v. Thornton, 39 Tenn. App. 225, 282 S.W.2d 361 (1955), but
no reported case specifically held that the advancements doctrine did not apply to gifts
between decedent and heirs other than decedents children. But see Robinson v. Robinson,
23 Tenn. (4 Hum.) 392, 393 (1843) (dicta suggesting advancement can be made to a
relative).
11. All American jurisdictions except Michigan have statutes providing for advance-
ments. Michigan had an advancements statute until 1979 when the legislature repealed it as
part of its general replacement of the probate code. The Michigan legislature failed to enact
an advancements statute within its new revised code. Michigan, however, did enact a statute
relating to satisfaction. MICH. Comp. LAws § 700.139 (1979); see infra note 40. The action by
the Michigan legislature may have been unintentional, but the omission has not yet been
corrected. This legislative inaction leaves uncertain the treatment of advancements in Mich-
igan. If Michigan continues to recognize advancements, then that recognition now must
come from the common law. Michigan generally recognizes the common law of England as
modified by English statutes of general application. In re Sanderson, 289 Mich. 165, 286
N.W. 198 (1939). For example, the Michigan courts have recognized the English Habeas
Corpus Act of 1679 as part of the Michigan common law. People v. Den Uyl, 320 Mich. 447,
31 N.W.2d 699 (1948). Thus, the customs of London and York, which are recognized as the
forerunners of advancements in England, as well as the English Statute of Distribution,
which was passed before the English Habeas Corpus Act, arguably may serve as the founda-
tion of a Michigan common law of advancements. See Elbert, Advancements: I, supra note
4, at 674. But cf. Putman's Adm'r v. Heirs of Putnam, 18 Ohio 347 (1849) (holding that the
court could not recognize advancements of personalty because the legislature did not au-
thorize this exception to the distribution statute for personalty as it had done for the de-
scent of land).
The following states statutes have adopted UPC § 2-110: ALA. CODE § 43-8-49 (1975);
ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.050 (1973); Aiuz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 14-1220 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 12, § 509 (1979); HAwAn Rav. STAT. § 560:2-110 (1976); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-110 (1982);
Mo. Rzv. STAT. § 474.090 (Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-206 (1983); NEB. RzV.
STAT. § 30-2310 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-10 (1976). The following states have
enacted UPC § 2-110 with minor nonsubstantive changes: FL.. STAT. § 733.806 (1981);
IDAHO CODE § 15-2-110 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-110 (1978). Other states have
adopted the UPC language in large part, but these statutes include some significantly differ-
ent language: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-153 (1971) (writing not expressly required to be exe-
cuted contemporaneously with the making of the gift; does not expressly provide that decla-
ration or acknowledgement can operate to bind issue of donee); COLO. Rzv. STAT. § 15-11-
110 (1973) (applies to partial intestacy); Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-110 (1964) (al-
lows the decedent to establish the value of the property, which is the subject of the advance-
ment, in the contemporaneous writing); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-13 (West 1983) (not clear
whether statute applies to partial intestacy); Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 2105.051 (Page 1976)
(not clear whether statute applies to partial intestacy); OR. Rav. STAT. §§ 112.135, .155
(1981) (writing not expressly required to be executed contemporaneously with the making of
the gift; contrary to the UPC, the property advanced shall be taken into account in comput-
ing the share going to the advancee's issue if the advances predeceases the decedent); 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2109.1 (Purdon Supp. 1983) (applies to partial intestacy; writing not
expressly required to be executed contemporaneously with the making of the gift); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-110 (1978) (writing not expressly required to be executed contemporane-
ously with the making of the gift; contrary to the UPC, the property advanced shall be
taken into account in computing the share going to the advances's issue if the advancee
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increasing popularity of wills for the wealthy"2 has made the ad-
vancements doctrine and the intestacy statute relevant only to es-
tates of less wealthy decedents. The cost of litigating the question
of advancements is often no longer worthwhile because of the rela-
tively small sums at stake. s Given that this doctrine is most useful
in modern American society to heirs of smaller estates, the law re-
predeceases the decedent); Wyo. STAT. § 2-4-108 (1980) (not clear whether statute applies to
partial intestacy; the property advanced is valued as of the date on which the heir comes
into possession or enjoyment and, unlike the UPC, death of the decedent prior to possession
or enjoyment is not an alternative valuation date).
For statutes that do not expressly refer to a contemporaneous writing, the courts have
imposed such a requirement anyway. See, e.g., Hirning v. Webb, 91 Idaho 229, 419 P.2d 671
(1966); Elliott v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 243 IM. 614, 90 N.E. 1104 (1910); Harness v.
Harness, 49 Ind. 384 (1885); In re Estate of Hessler, 79 Neb. 691, 113 N.W. 147 (1907);
Arthur v. Arthur, 143 Wis. 126, 126 N.W. 550 (1910). See infra note 58 and accompanying
text for discussion of whether lineal descendants of the advancee are bound by an
advancement.
If the language of an advancements statute fails to provide clearly whether the doctrine
applies when the decedent dies partially intestate, the courts conflict on the proper interpre-
tation. For cases holding that the advancements statute applies only when the decedent dies
wholly, rather than partially, intestate, see Little v. Ennis, 207 Ala. 111, 92 So. 167 (1922);
Gilmore v. Jenkins, 129 Iowa 686, 106 N.W. 193 (1906); In re Estate of Beier, 205 Minn. 43,
284 N.W. 833 (1939); Bowron v. Kent, 190 N.Y. 422, 83 N.E. 472 (1908); Jenkins v. Mitchell,
57 N.C. (4 Jones Eq.) 207 (1858). For cases holding that the advancements statute applies
when decedent dies partially intestate, see Dittoe's Adm'r v. Cluney's Ex'rs, 22 Ohio St. 436
(1872); McClure v. Steele, 14 Rich. Eq. 105 (S.C. 1858).
Many advancements statutes expressly apply only when the decedent dies totally intes-
tate. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 29-1-2-10 (1982); WASH. Rav. CODE § 11.04.041 (1983); U.P.C. §
2-110 (1977). Other statutes expressly permit advancements when the decedent dies par-
tially intestate. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1050 (West 1981), repealed by Probate Law &
Procedure Act, ch. 842, § 44, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4491 (West) (effective Jan. 1, 1985)
(interpreted in In re Estate of Hayne, 165 Cal. 568, 133 P. 277 (1913); CAL. PROB. CODE §
6409(a) (West Supp. 1984) (effective Jan. 1, 1985) expressly applies only when decedent dies
totally intestate); Ky. Rav. STAT. § 391.140 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 64.1-17
(1980).
12. See Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at
Death, 30 U. CHi. L. REv. 241, 244, 248, 249-51 (1963); Powell & Looker, Decedents' Estate
Illumination from Probate and Tax Records, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 919, 921-27 (1930); Ward &
Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L. Ra,. 393, 411-13; see also
Friedman, Patterns of Testation in the 19th Century: A Study of Essex County (New
Jersey) Wills, 8 Am. J. LEOAL HIST. 34, 34-35 (1964).
13. For example, a review of New York cases after 1900 shows that only two cases
dealt with advancements. See Johnson v. Cole, 178 N.Y. 364, 70 N.E. 873 (1904); In re
Bennington, 67 Misc. 363, 124 N.Y.S. 829 (Sur. Ct. 1910). Other cases tangentially consider-
ing the doctrine concerned a gift prior to execution of a will, Bowron v. Kent, 190 N.Y. 422,
83 N.E. 472 (1908), partial intestacy, In re Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 181 A.D. 642, 168
N.Y.S. 952 (1918), aff'd, 225 N.Y. 666, 122 N.E. 880 (1919) (partial intestacy occurring as a
result of settlement between intestate heirs and will beneficiaries); Estate of Finck, 120
Misc. 428, 198 N.Y.S. 670 (Sur. Ct. 1923); a loan, In re Robinson, 45 Misc. 551, 92 N.Y.S.
967 (Sur. Ct. 1904) (intestate estate); or a release, Estate of Merrihew, 171 Misc. 541, 14
N.Y.S.2d 360 (Sur. Ct. 1939) (intestate estate).
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former's task becomes clear-an advancement statute should re-
flect the probable intent of less wealthy decedents and be self-im-
plementing so that extensive litigation becomes unnecessary. "
The UPC drafters' response to the needs of less wealthy intes-
tate decedents was an advancements statute that recognized a life-
time gift to an heir as an advancement of that heir's inheritance
only if the gift was either accompanied by a writing indicating the
decedent's intent to make it an advancement or if it was acknowl-
edged in writing by the heir as an advancement." After first dem-
14. The low number of advancements cases shown, supra note 13, might be attributa-
ble to decedents' no longer making lifetime gifts for which any evidence suggests that the
decedents intended advancements. A review of satisfactions cases, however, suggests that
lifetime gifts are still being made, but that parties cannot afford to litigate the question of
the testamentary effect of these gifts with respect to small intestate estates. See infra notes
40-45 and accompanying text for a definition of the satisfactions doctrine. A satisfaction is a
lifetime gift made by a testator to a legatee or devisee with the intent that it be a substitute
for a bequest or devise found in the testators will. Both the satisfactions and advancements
doctrines concern lifetime gifts made by the decedents. Thus, satisfaction is the analogue to
the doctrine of advancements in the law of wills. A fair inference can be made from a
greater number of satisfactions cases, therefore, that more advancements claims would be
pursued if intestate decedents had larger estates. In New York the number of satisfactions
cases decided after 1900 far outnumbered the number of advancements cases decided during
that same period. See Estate of Snyder, 78 Misc. 2d 322, 358 N.Y.S.2d 824 (Sur. Ct. 1974);
Estate of McDonnell, 32 Misc. 2d 471, 222 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sur. Ct. 1961); In re Ludwig, 207
Misc. 860, 140 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sur. Ct. 1955); In re Will of Hall, 120 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sur. Ct.
1953), af'd, 284 A.D. 1013, 135 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1954); In re Lutz, 201 Misc. 539, 107 N.Y.S.2d
388 (Sur. Ct. 1951); In re Frank, 195 Misc. 406, 90 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sur. Ct. 1949); In re
Singer's Estate, 171 Misc. 509, 13 N.Y.S.2d 37 (Sur. Ct. 1939); Estate of Bernhardi, 151
Misc. 480, 273 N.Y.S. 250 (Sur. Ct. 1934); In re Weiss, 39 Misc. 71, 78 N.Y.S. 877 (Sur.
1902); see also In re Will of Fahnestock, 273 A.D. 767, 75 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1947), aft'd, 298
N.Y. 647, 82 N.E.2d 38 (1948) (ambiguous provision in will as to how to account for previous
gift made to devisee); In re German's Estate, 107 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sur. Ct. 1951) (same); In re
Ferge's Will, 67 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sur. Ct. 1947) (same); In re Estate of Willis, 158 Misc. 534,
287 N.Y.S. 165 (Sur. Ct. 1936) (same). Compare the above cited cases with the advance-
ments cases reported in New York after 1900. See supra note 13.
15. The UPC provides:
If a person dies intestate as to all his estate, property which he gave in his lifetime to
an heir is treated as an advancement against the latter's share of the estate only if
declared in a contemporaneous writing by the decedent or acknowledged in writing by
the heir to be an advancement. For this purpose the property advanced is valued as of
the time the heir came into possession or enjoyment of the property or as of the time of
death of the decedent, whichever first occurs. If the recipient of the property fails to
survive the decedent, the property is not taken into account in computing the intestate
share to be received by the recipient's issue, unless the declaration or acknowledgement
provides otherwise.
U.P.C. § 2-110 (1977).
The Model Probate Code of 1946 (MPC) proposed to reverse the prevalent, court cre-
ated presumption in favor of gifts being advancements. The MPC states that "every gratui-
tous intervivos transfer is deemed to be an absolute gift and not an advancement unless
shown to be an advancement." M.P.C. § 29(a) (1946). If one assumes that the problem to be
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onstrating that imposing this writing requirement effectively re-
peals the advancements doctrine by failing to address the needs of
intestate decedents, this essay then explores the reasons the draft-
ers concealed the repeal by retaining the formal recognition of the
advancements doctrine in the Code.
Intuitively, one suspects that the writing requirement effec-
tively abolishes the advancements doctrine because those persons
who are sophisticated enough to make an advancement in writing
are more likely to execute a will." A review of the statutory devel-
opment and litigation of the advancements doctrine during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries bolsters this assumption.17
Most jurisdictions modeled their original advancements stat-
utes after the English Statute* of Distribution,"8 which provided
only the manner for a general accounting for lifetime gifts.19 These
solved was excessive litigation concerning advancements, reversing the presumption as to
the decedent's intent was an insufficient response. As long as the enigmatic question of spe-
cific intent of the decedent remained at issue, reversing the presumption would not be a
significant deterrent to heirs from pursuing their claim. This MPC provision was adopted in
Indiana and Iowa. IND. CODE § 29-1-2-10 (1982); IOWA CODE § 633.224 (1983). Other states
that similarly have reversed the common-law presumption by statute are North Carolina,
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-2(1), -24 (1976) (an advancement to decedents spouse must be ac-
companied by a contemporaneous writing designating gift as an advancement), Texas, TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. § 44 (Vernon 1980), and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 11.04.041 (1983)
(Washington previously had required a writing, Act of Mar. 16, 1917, ch. 156, § 33, 1917
Wash. Laws 651).
16. Certainly, attorneys would advise most clients to write a will rather than rely on
the advancements statute.
17. The emergence of statutory reform in the nineteenth century, see infra notes 28-33
and accompanying text, and the increasing popularity of wills in the twentieth century, see
supra note 12, explain the focus on this time period.
18. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 12, 1822, § 14, 1822 Fla. Laws 7; Act of Dec. 25, 1821, § 1,
1821 Ga. Laws 52-53; Act of Jan. 25, 1839, § 46, 1839 Iowa Acts 486.
19. The English Statute of Distribution provided:
... to and amongst the Children of such persons dyeing intestate, and such persons as
legally represent such Children in case any of the said Children be then dead, other
than such Childe or Children (not being Heire at Law) who shall have any Estate by
the Setlement of the Intestate, or shall be advanced by the Intestate in his Lifetime by
portion or portions equall to the share which shall by such distributcon allotted to the
other Children, to whome such distributcon is to be made. And in case any Childe,
other than the Heire at Law who shall have any Estate by Setlement from.the said
Intestate, or shall be advanced by the said Intestate in his Lifetime by portion not
equall to the share which will be due to the other Children by such distributcon as
aforesaid, then soe much of the Surplusage of the Estate of such Intestate to be distrib-
uted to such Childe or Children as shall have any Land by Setlement from the Intes-
tate, or were advanced in the Lifetime of the Intestate as shall make the Estate of all
the said Children to be equall as neere as can be estimated. But the Heire at Law
notwithstanding any Land that he shall have by descent or otherwise from the Intes-
tate is to have an equall part in the distributcon with the rest of the Children without
any consideration of the value of the Land which he hath by descent or otherwise from
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statutes made no attempt to define an advancement or to provide
guidelines on the types of transfers treated as advancements rather
than absolute gifts. 0 The American courts generally refused to
adopt any objective tests to identify advancements. Instead, they
interpreted the advancements statutes as authorizing an inquiry to
determine if decedent's specific intent was to make an advance-
ment rather than an absolute gift.21 Predictably, this judicial in-
quiry created a significant amount of litigation on an array of legal
issues: Must the decedent possess the intent to make an advance-
ment at the time of the gift or may the decedent acquire the requi-
site intent at any time prior to death?2 Could a decedent, having
the intent to make an advancement, later change that intent and
the Intestate.
English Statute of Distribution, 22 & 23 Car. II, ch. 10, § 3 (1670). "Heire at Law" refers to
the eldest son under the principle of primogeniture. An advancement of land to the eldest
son would not decrease his share of the intestate personalty. Further, the common-law rule
that the eldest son suffered no abatement of the descended lands because the decedent had
made an advancement of personalty continued to apply. The Statute of Distribution, how-
ever, was interpreted to require the eldest son to bring any advancements of personalty to
the estate if he wanted to share in the intestate personalty. Pratt v. Pratt, Fitg. 284, 94 Eng.
Rep. 758 (1731).
20. These early American statutes and the English Statute of Distribution are typical
of statutes enacted before the twentieth century. The legislatures expressed their policies
only in general terms, leaving the courts to provide specific detail. Some commentators re-
gret that these enactments are no longer the norm. See G. CALABRESi, supra note 1, at 5-6;
G. GmmoRo, supra note 1, at 95-96.
21. For examples of cases in which courts have held intent relevant, see Booth v. Fos-
ter, 111 Ala. 312, 20 So. 356 (1896); Holland v. Bonner, 142 Ark. 214, 218 S.W. 665 (1920);
Page v. Elwell, 81 Colo. 73, 253 P. 1059 (1927); Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322 (1850);
Holliday v. Wingfield, 59 Ga. 206 (1877); Woolery v. Woolery, 29 Ind. 249 (1868); Barber v.
Taylor's Heirs, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 84 (1839); Graves v. Spedden, 46 Md. 527 (1877); Bulkeley
v. Noble, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 337 (1824); Speer v. Speer, 14 N.J. Eq. 240 (1862); Kiger v.
Terry, 119 N.C. 456, 26 S.E. 38 (1896); Fels v. Fels, 1 Ohio C.C. 420 (1886). South Carolina
is the only state in which the courts have held that the specific intent of the decedent is
irrelevant. The objective circumstances surrounding the gift, however, such as the amount
or purpose of the gift, are considered to determine if a court should treat a particular gift as
an advancement. See Heyward v. Middleton, 65 S.C. 493, 43 S.E. 956 (1903); Rees v. Rees,
11 Rich. Eq. 86 (S.C. 1859); M'Caw v. Blewit, 2 McCord Eq. 90 (S.C. 1827).
22. See, e.g., Wallace v. Owen, 71 Ga. 544 (1883) (donor unable to change an executed
gift into an advancement without the donee's consent); Bolin v. Bolin, 245 Ill. 613, 92 N.E.
530 (1910) (donor unable to change an executed gift into an advancement without the do-
nee's consent); see also Guardianship of Hudelson, 18 Cal. 2d 401, 115 P.2d 805 (1941)
(transfers made from an incompetent's estate during his life to his daughter could be ad-
vancements even though the incompetent was incapable of possessing the requisite intent to
make a transfer because the court acted for the incompetent and its order must be taken in
lieu of the written expression of the donor's intent); In re Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 181
A.D. 642, 168 N.Y.S. 952 (1918), afi'd, 225 N.Y. 666, 122 N.E. 880 (1919) (although the court
held transfers to be absolute gifts, the court indicated that it had the power to make ad-
vancements from an incompetent's estate).
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make an absolute gift? If so, would the change of intent have to be
manifested in any formal manner?23 Upon proof of what circum-
stances, if any, should a presumption arise in favor of an advance-
ment?2 4 The courts, even after resolving these legal issues, were
severely burdened with factual disputes 5 that were exacerbated by
the inevitable unreliability of the evidence admitted to show dece-
dent's intent.26
Disenchantment with the operation of the advancements doc-
23. See, e.g., Wallace v. Owen, 71 Ga. 544 (1883) (evidence that the donor did not
want his children to account for the gift and that he would tear up the memorandum chang-
ing the gift to his children, which he did, was admissible); Calhoun v. Taylor, 178 Iowa 56,
159 N.W. 600 (1916) (decedent by stipulation in a deed advanced $1000 to a son as his full
interest as heir, to which son agreed, and the decedent had not converted the advancement
into a gift by making a subsequent gift to his son); Gunn v. Thruston, 130 Mo. 339, 32 S.W.
654 (1895) (presumption for advancement may be rebutted by subsequent declarations of
the decedent to third persons); Oler v. Bonebrake, 65 Pa. 338 (1870) (the finding of "family
book" with items of advancement erased held not sufficient to establish a change of inten-
tion when the decedent had been mentally incompetent for several years prior to his death
because the competency of the decedent at the time of the cancellation was unknowable).
24. Most courts created a presumption in favor of an advancement upon proof of a gift
of a substantial value. See, e.g., Autrey v. Autrey's Adm'r, 37 Ala. 614 (1861); Holland v.
Bonner, 142 Ark. 214, 218 S.W. 665 (1920); Holliday v. Wingfield, 59 Ga. 206 (1877); Max-
well v. Maxwell, 109 IM. 588 (1884); McCaw v. Burk, 31 Ind. 56 (1869); Burton v. Baldwin,
61 Iowa 283, 16 N.W 110 (1883); Cecil v. Cecil, 19 Md. 72 (1862); Whitfield v. Whitfield, 40
Miss. 352 (1866); Harper v. Harper, 92 N.C. 300 (1885); Sayles v. Baker, 5 R.I. 457 (1858).
See generally T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF WiLS § 129, at 719-22 (2d ed. 1953)
(discussing advancements).
25. See, e.g., Dillman v. Cox, 23 Ind. 440 (1864); Stewart v. Pattison, 8 Gill 46 (Md.
1849); Osgood v. Heirs of Breed, 17 Mass. 356 (1821); Wanmaker v. Van Buskirk, 1 N.J. Eq.
685 (1832); In re Will of Morgan, 104 N.Y. 74, 9 N.E. 861 (1887); Nobles v. Davenport, 185
N.C. 162, 116 S.E. 407 (1923), 183 N.C. 162, 111 S.E. 180 (1922); Law v. Smith, 2 R.I. 244
(1852); White v. White, 72 W. Va. 144, 77 S.E. 911 (1913).
26. See, e.g., Rumbly v. Stainton, 24 Ala. 712 (1854) (subsequent declarations of the
donor, unless made in the presence of the donee and sanctioned by him, are not admissible);
Distributees of Mitchell v. Mitchell's Adm'r, 8 Ala. 414 (1845) (decedent's oral declarations
admitted); Johnson v. Belden, 20 Conn. 322 (1850) (subsequent declarations by decedent
were admissible); Phillips v. Chappell, 16 Ga. 16 (1854) (decedent's oral declarations admit-
ted); Cline v. Jones, 111 Ill. 563 (1884) (declarations that decedent had given all his children
equal amounts of property admitted); Woolery v. Woolery, 29 Ind. 249 (1868) (declarations
of decedent immediately before and after a gift admissible to rebut presumption of advance-
ment); West v. Beck, 95 Iowa 520, 64 N.W. 599 (1895) (evidence of contemporaneous decla-
ration of decedent admissible); Parks v. Parks, 19 Md. 323 (1863) (the rule that parol evi-
dence is inadmissible to vary a written instrument cannot be invoked to exclude such
evidence when offered to show no advancement when the instrument is silent on this issue);
In re Estate of Martinez, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1070, 633 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1981) (court held
evidence of decedent's conversations on his intent to make an advancement many years
after the gift was insufficient to support finding of an advancement); Neil v. Flynn Lumber
Co., 82 W. Va. 24, 95 S.E. 523 (1918) (when intent of father and child do not appear from
any writing executed by them, it may be deduced from their prior, contemporaneous, or
subsequent declarations, their subsequent conduct as to property, and the father's evident
intent to make distributions before his death).
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trine developed quickly.27 A forerunner to UPC section 2-110 can
be found as early as 1784 in Massachusetts,"8 which enacted a stat-
ute that did not require a writing in all cases, but included in the
definition of an advancement a gift charged in writing or accompa-
27. Chancellor Kent, a leading nineteenth century jurist in the area of wills and trusts,
identifies the Etates that required a writing, but he neither suggests the reasons for the
deviation from the Statute of Distribution nor comments on the advisability of imposing a
writing requirement. 4 J. KENT, COMMENTRIES ON AMERICAN LAW 444 (9th ed. 1888).
The only persuasive explanation for these state statutes is that legislatures enacted
them in an effort to reduce the amount of difficult litigation concerning advancements. The
statutes requiring advancements in writing became popular in some of the Western and
Midwestern states, such as Arizona and the Dakota Territories, where the legislatures were
required to enact quickly an entire body of law. See L. FRIrDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 340-58 (1973). That situation alone does not explain adequately the use of the writing
requirement, however, because other jurisdictions such as Florida and Iowa also were re-
quired to enact quickly a body of law. These states chose to continue the English Statute of
Distribution language and not to limit expressly the quality of evidence to prove an ad-
vancement. See supra note 18. An examination of other parts of the succession law likewise
cannot explain satisfactorily these early writing statutes. Conceivably, the rejection of other
doctrines vital to the English law of descent relating to lineal descendants, such as primo-
geniture, see Page, supra note 9, at 11-14, might have made these lawmakers suspect the
advancements doctrine, which was based on the assumption of equality among children.
Since such changes were not unique to states imposing a writing requirement for proving
advancements, id. at 22-27, however, such an explanation seems tenuous. Alternatively, the
writing requirement may have represented only a part of a general pattern in these jurisdic-
tions' succession laws for imposing formalities on testamentary acts and strictly limiting
extrinsic evidence to show the decedent's testamentary intent. The existence in several of
these jurisdictions of liberal rules with respect to the doctrine of satisfactions, however, sug-
gests that this explanation is also unsatisfactory. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying
text.
A commentary accompanying a writing requirement provision in the 1865 version of the
proposed New York Civil Code is the best available evidence that the drafters primarily
sought to reduce litigation through these enactments. A commission appointed by the State
of New York, which included David Dudley Field as its foremost member, published a gen-
eral civil code as an alternative to the common law. See L. FRIED AN, supra, at 340-58;
Atkinson, Codfication of Probate Law, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS CELE-
BRATING ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL REFORM 177-203 (A. Reppy ed. 1949). (This provi-
sion was adopted by the Dakota Territory. See infra note 33.). The Commission's motivat-
ing factor-the reduction of litigation-was stated as follows:
Questions of considerable embarrassment, which frequently arise in determining what
is to be deemed an advancement, and what is to be taken as its value, have led the
commissioners to insert the provision, that in order to constitute a settlement an ad-
vancement, within these provisions, its purpose and value must be expressed in the
instrument.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE, THE CIMV CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK §
654, Comments, at 190 (1865)[hereinafter cited as FIELD'S CivwL CODE].
28. See W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAw-THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCImTY, 1760-1830, at 91-92 (1975) (describing the emergence
of the Massachusetts legislature's willingness to exercise sovereign power and change the
common law).
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nied by a memorandum.29 In 1806, Massachusetts amended the
statute to restrict advancements to gifts for which the intent to
make an advancement is expressed in writing.30 During the mid-
1800's, when codification of the common law gained popularity, es-
pecially in the West, 1 the 1806 Massachusetts advancements stat-
ute became a modeP2 for more than a dozen jurisdictions.33 These
29. The statute, in pertinent part, reads:
That any deed of lands or tenements made for love and affection, or where any per-
sonal estate delivered a child shall be charged in writing by the Intestate, or by his
order, or a memorandum made thereof, or delivered expressly for that purpose, before
two witnesses who were bid to take notice thereof, the same shall be deemed and taken
an advancement to such child or children to the value of such lands, tenements or
personal estate, within the intent of this act.
Act of Mar. 9, 1784, ch. 36, 1782-83 Mass. Laws 582. Similar language is found in a 1789
New Hampshire statute. Act of Feb. 3, 1789, reprinted in 5 N.H. LAWS, FIRST CONsTrru-
ToNAL PERIOD 1784-1792, at 386 (H. Metcalf ed. 1916). This statute remains in force today.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 561:15-:16 (1974). Rhode Island and Vermont also adopted this
statutory language in the 1820's. R.I. Laws § 4, at 226 (1822), approved, Jan. 2, 1822; Act of
Nov. 15, 1821, § 76, 1821 Vt. Laws 58. Both these states have retained the statute with only
slight modification. R.I. GEN. LAws § 33-1-11 (1969); VT. STAT ANN. tit. 14, § 1723 (1974).
This statute also was adopted briefly in the early 1800's by territories in the Midwest. Mich-
igan enacted the 1784 Massachusetts statute. Act of July 27, 1818, §§ 7, 18, reprinted in 1
Mich. Terr. Laws 359, 366 (1871). When Wisconsin became a separate territory from Michi-
gan in 1836, the 1784 statute became a part of its law. Wis. Organic Act, § 12, approved,
Apr. 20, 1836, found in 5 Stat. 15 (1846); see also Act of Dec. 9, 1836, § 1, 1836 Wis. Terr.
Laws 110-11 (reaffirming that Michigan Territorial law applied). Wisconsin reenacted this
same statutory provision in 1839. Act of July 4, 1839, § 41, 1839 Wis. Terr. Laws 305. The
1784 Massachusetts statute became part of Minnesota law when Minnesota became a sepa-
rate territory on March 3, 1849, and its Organic Act adopted the laws of Wisconsin in force
as of that date. Minn. Organic Act § 12, approved, Mar. 3, 1849, found in 9 Stat. 407 (1851).
Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin later adopted the more restrictive 1806 Massachusetts
advancements statute. See infra note 33.
30. The Massachusetts statute of 1806 provides:
That all gifts or grants made by the Intestate to any child or grand child of any estate
real or personal, in advancement of the portion of such child or grand child, and which
shall be expressed in such gift or grant, or otherwise charged by the intestate in writing
or acknowledged in writing by the child or grand child as made for such advancement,
such estate, real and personal, shall be taken and estimated in the distribution and
partition of the intestates real & personal estate as part of the same;
Act of Mar. 12, 1806, ch. 90, § 3, 1804-05 Mass. Laws 508-09. The statutory language is
ambiguous as to whether a writing was the exclusive means of proving an advancement. The
Massachusetts courts interpreted the statute restrictively and made clear that a writing was
the exclusive means of proving an advancement. See Barton v. Rice, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 508
(1839); Bullard v. Bullard, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 527 (1827); Ashley, Appellant, 21 Mass. (4
Pick.) 21 (1826). But see Bransford v. Crawford, 51 Ga. 20 (1874) (interpreting similar lan-
guage, a court held that the statute did not preclude proof of decedent's intent to make an
advancement by other types of evidence). See generally infra notes 72-73 and accompany-
ing text.
31. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, at 351-55.
32. For discussions of drafters' propensity to borrow statutes from other states, see
Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IowA L. Rv. 41 (1937); Riesenfeld, Law-Mak-
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early enactments, which required written proof of the decedent's
ing and Legislative Precedent in American Legal History, 33 MIN. L. Ray. 103, 141-43
(1949) (describing in general terms the reliance of these midwestern and western territories
on Massachusetts law).
33. The most prevalent statutory language found in these earlier enactments was: "All
gifts and grants shall be deemed to have been made in advancement, if they are expressed
in the gift or grant to be so made, or if charged in writing by the intestate as an advance-
ment, or acknowledged in writing as such by the child or other descendant." How=LL CODE,
ch. 26, § 9, at 184. This provision was adopted in the following jurisdictions: MN. CONST. art.
X, § 3 (continuing in force the laws of Massachusetts; Maine had been part of Massachu-
setts until June 19, 1819, at which time Massachusetts passed the Act of Separation, Act of
June 19, 1819, ch. 161, 1818-22 Mass. Laws 248-60; the Massachusetts law as of 1820, when
Maine became a state, included statutory language only slightly different than that shown
above, see MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 90, § 3 (1823); statutory language can be found in Mn. LAWS
tit. 51, § 40 (1821)); Howell Code, supra, adopted, 1864 Ariz. Terr. Laws 71 (in Awz. Rv.
STAT. § 1465 (1887), approved, Mar. 8, 1887, the writing requirement was eliminated; upon
passage of the Uniform Probate Act it was reinstated, Act of Apr. 24, 1973, ch. 75, § 4, at §
14-2110, 1973 Ariz. Seas. Laws 366); Act of Apr. 13, 1850, ch. 96, § 7, 1849-50 Cal. Laws 221;
GA. CODE § 2538 (1861), adopted, Act of Dec. 19, 1860, § I, i860 Ga. Laws 24; Act of Feb. 1,
1864, ch. 3, § 321, 1864 Idaho Terr. Laws 390; Act of Apr. 9, 1872, § 7, 1871-72 Ill. Laws
354; MIcH. REv. STAT. ch. 67, § 9 (1846), adopted, Act of May 18, 1846, No. 150, § 1, 1846
Mich. Laws 272 (revisors cited in margin Bullard v. Bullard, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 526 (1827);
Ashley, Appellant, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 21 (1826)); MIm. TnRm Rav. STAT. ch. 50, § 8 (1851),
approved, Mar. 31, 1851; Probate Practice Act, § 546, 1877 Mont. Terr. Laws 368; NEB.
TzRR. RaV. STAT. ch. 14, § 37 (1866), approved, Feb. 12, 1866; Act of Nov. 29, 1861, § 320,
1861 Nev. Terr. Laws 240; OKLA. TERR. STAT. § 6905 (1890), approved, Dec. 24, 1890; OR.
GEN. LAws ch. 10, § 10, at 677 (M. Deady ed. 1845-64) (original session laws unavailable;
enacted Oct. 24, 1864); Act of Mar. 13, 1884, ch. 44, tit. 2, § 14, 1884 Utah Terr. Laws 76;
Act of Apr. 27, 1854, § 239, 1854 Wash. Terr. Laws 307; Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 63, § 8 ('1849),
approved, Jan. 10, 1849 (effective Jan. 1, 1850, Wis. REV. STAT. ch. 157, § 1 (1849)).
Another variation of the writing requirement, taken from FIELD's CIVIL CODE, supra
note 27, § 654, at 190, was enacted in the Dakota Territory in the 1860's as follows:
When any real or personal property, or both, whether within or without this Territory,
of a person who dies intestate as to all his property, has been advanced by such intes-
tate, directly, or by virtue of a beneficial power, or of a power in trust with a right of
selection, to a person entitled to succeed to his property, and with a view to a portion
or settlement in life, and so expressed in the instrument establishing the settlement or
portion, the value thereof as expressed in the instrument must be reckoned, for the
purposes of this section only, as part of the property of such intestate which his succes-
sors are to receive; and if such advancement equals or exceeds the share which such
relative would be entitled to receive, of the property so reckoned, then such relative
and his successors have no share in the property of the intestate. But if the advance-
ment is less than such share, he and his successors are to have so much only of the
property as is sufficient to make it equal to such share.
Act to Establish a Civil Code, § 654, 1865-66 Dak. Terr. Laws 118-19. By 1877 the Dakota
Territory had enacted the more prevalent language from the 1806 Massachusetts statute.
See DA. TamR. REv. CODE § 790 (1877).
At the time the UPC promulgated its advancements statute, the following states had
taken the Massachusetts lead and adopted statutes requiring a writing to prove an advance-
ment. CAL. PROB. CODE § 1050 (West 1981), repealed by Probate Law & Procedure Act, ch.
842, § 44, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4491 (West) (effective Jan. 1, 1985); IDAHO CODE § 14-109
(1948), repealed by Uniform Probate Code Act, ch. 111, § 3, 1971 Idaho Seass. Laws 374; Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 110-2h, § 2-5(a) (1983); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1151 (1964), repealed by
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intent to make an advancement, provide an opportunity to evalu-
ate the impact of a writing requirement on the doctrine of ad-
vancements. In addition, the experience in these jurisdictions with
such statutes provides evidence as to what results the UPC draft-
ers reasonably could have expected from a statute that required
written proof of the decedent's intent to make an advancement.
As explained earlier, 4 advancements litigation decreased after
1900 as the popularity of testacy increased-especially for those
decedents dying with substantial estates for which the expense of
litigation would be warranted. Not unexpectedly, jurisdictions that
require written proof of the decedent's intent to make an advance-
ment have experienced a greater decline in advancements litigation
than those states without a writing requirement.3 5 Although this
Probate Code Act, ch. 540, § 24-C, 1976 Me. Laws 1113; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 196, § 5
(West 1958); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 702.90 (1970), repealed by Revised Probate Code Act, No.
642, § 993, 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 2585; Minn. Stat. § 525.53 (1974), repealed by Act of June
5, 1975, ch. 347, § 144, 1975 Minn. Laws 1104; MONT. CODE ANN. § 91-414 (1947), repealed
by Uniform Probate Code Act, ch. 365, 1974 Mont. Laws 1378; NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 30-115
(1964), repealed by Probate Code Act, Leg. Bill 354, § 315(5), 1974 Neb. Laws 263-64; Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 151.120 (1983); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 561:15-:16 (1974) (as an alternative to a
writing for an advancement of personal property, the statute provides that an advancement
be delivered "in the presence of two witnesses who were requested to take notice thereof";
additionally, an advancement of real property can be proved if made for love or affection,
see supra note 29); N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRusTS LAW § 2-1.5(b) (McKinney 1981); N.D.
CEr. CODE § 30-21-14 (1960), repealed by Uniform Probate Code Act, ch. 257, § 82, 1973
N.D. Sess. Laws 777; OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 225 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 111.120 (1963),
repealed by Act of June 16, 1969, ch. 591, § 305(1), 1969 Or. Laws 1221-22; R.L GEN. LAWS §
33-1-11 (1969) (similar to New Hampshire statute); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-1-18
(1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-4-20 (1953), repealed by Uniform Probate Code, ch. 150, § 1,
1975 Utah Laws 580; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1723 (1974) (similar to New Hampshire stat-
ute); Wis. STAT. § 852.11 (1981-82).
34. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
35. Evidence to show that the writing requirement reduces the amount of advance-
ments litigation comes from a comparison of advancements cases reported after 1900 in
Minnesota, which imposed a writing requirement, see supra notes 29 and 33, and cases re-
ported after 1900 in Iowa, which did not impose a writing requirement, see supra notes 15
and 18. In Minnesota, only two cases were reported raising the issue of advancements with
respect to estates of intestate decedents. See Bruski v. Bruski, 148 Minn. 458, 182 N.W. 620
(1921) (relief was requested to amend the final decree distributing father's intestate estate
on basis that decree was procured by fraud or mistake by fact that two of his children failed
to admit advancements for which they had signed written acknowledgements; court held
that one acknowledgement was procured by undue influence of the father against his daugh-
ter and that the other acknowledgement was not signed by the son); Gilman v. Maxwell, 79
Minn. 377, 82 N.W. 669 (1900) (without describing the factual basis for its decision, the
court upheld a lower court finding against the administrator that an advancement had not
been made to decedent's daughter). Other cases raised advancements as an issue, but they
either concerned testate estates, see In re Estate of Staples, 214 Minn. 337, 8 N.W.2d 45
(1943); In re Estate of Beier, 205 Minn. 43, 284 N.W. 833 (1939) (partially testate); Kuhne
v. Gau, 138 Minn. 34, 163 N.W. 982 (1917); Kragnes v. Kragnes, 125 Minn. 115, 145 N.W.
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decline indicates that the imposition of the writing requirement re-
lieved the administrative burden on the courts, this trend suggests
nothing about the reason advancements litigation is not being pur-
sued in jurisdictions requiring a writing.
Litigation may have declined in jurisdictions that imposed a
writing requirement because people do not intend lifetime gifts to
be considered upon distribution of their estates. By imposing the
writing requirement, the legislatures gave the decedent control
over the evidence that could be introduced with respect to a life-
time gift and protected the decedent's estate against claims based
on false or easily misinterpreted evidence. The problem with this
explanation for the decline in litigation is that it is essentially an
argument for repeal of the advancements doctrine rather than an
argument for the writing requirement. The decedent always has
had control over the effect of any lifetime gifts, because the dece-
dent always has had the power to execute a will. By enacting a
statute that permitted the introduction of a less formal instrument
to vary the operation of the intestate succession statute, the legis-
lature lessened, rather than eliminated, the risk that false claims
that the decedent intended to make an advancement would be
made against the decedent's estate."6
An alternative explanation for the decline in litigation is that
although decedents are making lifetime gifts with the intention
that they be taken into account in the distribution of the probate
785 (1914), or the transferor of the advancement was still alive, see Holste v. Baker, 223
Minn. 321, 26 N.W.2d 473 (1947); Leach v. Leach, 162 Minn. 159, 202 N.W. 448 (1925). In
comparison, Iowa reported 19 cases in which the question whether the decedent intended to
make an advancement was a central issue in the decision. The court held that the decedent
had made an advancement in the following cases: Murphy v. Callan, 199 Iowa 216, 199 N.W.
981 (1924); In re Estate of Sells, 197 Iowa 696, 197 N.W. 922 (1924); Woods v. Knotts, 196
Iowa 544, 194 N.W. 953 (1923) (alternative holding); Calhoun v. Taylor, 178 Iowa 56, 159
N.W. 600 (1916); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 159 Iowa 394, 139 N.W. 466 (1913) (court held that
transfer was a completed gift in the form of an advancement rather than a constructive
trust); Mossesstad v. Gunderson, 140 Iowa 290, 118 N.W. 374 (1908); Hickey v. Davidson,
129 Iowa 384, 105 N.W. 678 (1906) (facts also could support a release); Eastwood v. Crane,
125 Iowa 707, 101 N.W. 481 (1904); Ellis v. Newell, 120 Iowa 71, 94 N.W. 463 (1903). The
court held that the decedent did not make an advancement in the following cases: In re
Estate of Miller, 248 Iowa 19, 79 N.W.2d 315 (1956); In re Estate of Wiese, 222 Iowa 935,
270 NW. 380 (1936); In re Manatt Trust, 214 Iowa 432, 239 N.W. 524 (1931); Rollins v.
Jarrett, 207 Iowa 183, 222 N.W. 365 (1928) (grantor still alive); In re Estate of O'Hara, 204
Iowa 1331, 217 N.W. 245 (1928); Fell v. Bradshaw, 205 Iowa 100, 215 N.W. 595 (1927);
Young v. Young, 198 Iowa 789, 200 N.W. 181 (1924); Bash v. Bash, 182 Iowa 55, 165 N.W.
399 (1917); Bissell v. Bissell, 120 Iowa 127, 94 N.W. 465 (1903); Russell v. Smith, 115 Iowa
261, 88 N.W. 361 (1901).
36. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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estate, a writing is not accompanying these gifts. Thus, the disap-
pointed heirs have no basis for a claim that the decedent made an
advancement. If this explanation is correct, then the writing re-
quirement eliminated an administrative burden on the courts at
the cost of frustrating donative intent.
A third explanation for the decline in litigation concerning ad-
vancements in jurisdictions requiring a writing is that unambigu-
ous writings accompany most lifetime gifts intended to be ad-
vancements, eliminating any need for litigation.37 This is the only
explanation that justifies the writing requirement solution.
Support for either of the last two possible explanations for the
decline in litigation in writing jurisdictions is difficult because re-
ported cases are the only easily accessible source of data. A show-
ing that cases frequently concern the question of whether a prof-
fered ambiguous writing was sufficient under the statute to prove
an advancement would support the explanation that writings com-
monly accompany most gifts. That few of these cases exist,38 how-
ever, does not justify an inference that writings are uncommon, be-
cause the infrequency of litigation may be attributed to the
relatively high cost of litigating the issue.3
Reported cases concerning the satisfactions doctrine indirectly
provide insight into the operation of the advancements statutes. A
satisfaction is a lifetime gift made by the testator with the inten-
tion that it satisfy, in whole or in part, a bequest or devise.40 The
satisfactions doctrine essentially provides for the situation in
which the testator decides to change the timing of a gift to permit
the beneficiary to enjoy the gift before the testator's death.41 As
37. One purpose of a statutory formality is to serve a channeling function, which as-
sures the transferor predictable results if certain rules are followed. See Gulliver & Tilson,
supra note 7.
38. Interestingly, one of the two reported cases on advancements in Minnesota dis-
puted the validity of a writing. See Bruski v. Bruski, 148 Minn. 458, 182 N.W. 620 (1921).
39. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing popular-
ity of testacy, especially for decedents dying with large estates and the economic constraints
of litigating issues for small intestate estates).
40. See, e.g., In re Hall's Will, 120 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sur. Ct. 1953), afl'd, 284 A.D. 1013,
135 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1954); Moore v. Hilton, 39 Va. (12 Leigh) 1 (1841). To avoid cumbersome
language, hereinafter the term "devise" will be used to refer to testamentary gifts of both
personal property and real property.
41. The nature of the lifetime gift can differ significantly from the nature of the de-
vise. A gift of property that differs substantially from that devised to the donee under the
will, however, may raise a presumption that the testator did not intend to make a satisfac-
tion. See, e.g., Dugan v. Hollins, 4 Md. Ch. 139 (1853); Scholze v. Scholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80
(1925); In re Jacques, [1903] 1 Ch. 267; Holmes v. Holmes, 1 Bro. C.C. 555, 28 Eng. Rep.
1295 (1783). This presumption is not as strong in the United States as it is in England. See
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with advancements, the courts treat a gift as a satisfaction of a
devise only if the testator intended at the time of the gift that it be
taken into account when the estate is distributed under the will.42
In the nineteenth century, a handful of states adopted a writing
requirement to prove a satisfaction.43 For testate estates, which are
Louisville Trust Co. v. Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 148 Ky. 711, 147 S.W. 431
(1912); In re Vincent's Estate, 241 Mich. 329, 217 N.W. 65 (1928); Carmichael v. Lathrop,
108 Mich. 473, 66 N.W. 350 (1896); Alexander's Estate, 83 Pa. Super. 210 (1924) (pecuniary
legacy satisfied with gift of stock because evidence showed testator regarded stock as the
equivalent of money); Harrison's Ex'r v. Harrison's Adm'r, 171 Va. 224, 198 S.E. 902 (1938).
42. See, e.g., Kramer v. Kramer, 201 F. 248 (5th Cir. 1912); Cowles v. Cowles, 56 Conn.
240, 13 A. 414 (1888); Roberts v. Wilson, 200 Ga. 201, 36 S.E.2d 758 (1946); Richardson v.
Eveland, 126 11. 37, 18" N.E. 308 (1888); Rodgers v. Reinking, 205 Iowa 1311, 217 N.W. 441
(1928); Traughber v. King, 235 Ky. 658, 32 S.W.2d 8 (1930); Richards v. Humphreys, 32
Mass. (15 Pick.) 133 (1833); Domzalski v. Domzalski, 303 Mich. 103, 5 N.W.2d 672 (1942);
In re Estate of Wantz, 137 Neb. 307, 289 N.W. 363 (1939); Van Houten v. Post, 32 N.J. Eq.
709 (1880); In re Will of Williams, 71 N.M. 39, 376 P.2d 3 (1962); Degraaf v. Teerpenning,
52 How. Pr. 313 (N.Y. 1876); Grogan v. Ashe, 156 N.C. 286, 72 S.E. 372 (1911); Ellard v.
Ferris, 91 Ohio St. 339, 110 N.E. 476 (1915); Jones v. Mason, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 577 (1827).
But see Wickliffe v. Wickliffe, 206 Mo. App. 42, 226 S.W. 1035 (1920) (holding that satisfac-
tion requires consent of donee).
43. Field's Civil Code contained the following provision precluding recognition of a
satisfaction of a general legacy unless proof of testator's intent was expressed in writing.
"Advancements or gifts are not to be taken as ademptions of general legacies, unless such
intention is express by the testator in writing." FIELD'S CIVIL CODE, supra note 27, § 613, at
178. This same nineteenth century statutory language can be found in CAL. PROB. CODE §
1050 (West 1981), repealed by Probate Law & Procedure Act, ch. 842, § 44, 1983 Cal. Legis.
Serv. 4491 (West) (effective Jan. 1, 1985), replaced by CAL. PROB. CODE § 6174 (West Supp.
1984) (effective Jan. 1, 1985) (amended extensively from its original enactment in 1872);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 185 (1981) (originally enacted as OKLA. TERR. STAT. § 6869 (1890),
approved, Dec. 24, 1890); S.D. CODIFID LAWS ANN. § 29-6-14 (1976)(originally enacted as
Act to Establish a Civil Code, § 613, 1865-66 Dak. Terr. Laws 110). The language found in
the South Dakota statute was contained in the laws of Montana, North Dakota, and Utah
before these states adopted the UPC. MONT. CODE ANN. § 91-235 (1947) (originally enacted
as Probate Practice Act, ch. 17, § 508, 1877 Mont. Terr. Laws 360), repealed by Uniform
Probate Code Act, ch. 365, 1974 Mont. Laws 1378; N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-05-35 (1960) (orig-
inally enacted as Act to Establish a Civil Code, § 613, 1865-66 Dak. Terr. Laws 110), re-
pealed by Uniform Probate Code Act, ch. 257, § 82, 1973 N.D. Seass. Laws 777; UTAH CODE
ANN. § 74-2-35 (1953) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 13, 1884, ch. 44, tit. 1, ch. 2, § 35,
1884 Utah Terr. Laws 69), repealed by Uniform Probate Code Act, ch. 150, § 1, 1975 Utah
Laws 580.
In contrast to the doctrine of advancements, the doctrine of satisfactions is court made
and was not the subject ot widespread statutory enactment. Besides the statutes described
above, only a few other states have addressed the satisfaction doctrine in their statutes.
A statute that apparently does no more than recognize the doctrine can also be traced
to FIELD's CIVrL CODE, supra note 27, § 624, at 182, which states that "[a] legacy, or a gift in
contemplation, fear or peril of death may be satisfied." This statutory language still can be
found in OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 11 (1981) and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-6-21 (1976).
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, another type of satisfactions statute
found its way into laws of the District of Columbia, Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia
and remains in force today. W. VA. CONsT. art. XI, § 8 (adopted laws of Virginia in force as
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more likely to involve substantial wealth and, therefore, warrant
of June 10, 1863; first codification of provision found in W. VA. CODE ch. 77, § 11 (1868));
Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 1630, 31 Stat. 1434 (1901); Act of Mar. 24, 1851, ch. 617, ch. 3,
§ 17, 1851 Ky. Acts 229; VA. CODE ch. 122, § 12 (1849), adopted, Act of Aug. 15, 1849, ch. 2,
§ 1, 1849-50 Va. Acts 255. This satisfactions statute provides:
A provision for or advancement to any person shall be deemed a satisfaction in whole
or in part of a devise or bequest to such person contained in a previous will, if it would
be so deemed in case the devisee or legatee were the child of the testator; and whether
he is a child or not, it shall be so deemed in all cases in which it appears from parol or
other evidence to have been so intended.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-307 (1981) (language modified); Ky. REV. STAT. § 394.370 (Bobbs-Mer-
rill 1972); VA. CODE § 64.1-63 (1980); W. VA. CODE § 41-3-2 (1982). The meaning or purpose
of this statute is not obvious as demonstrated by the diverse interpretations given to it by
the courts of Kentucky and Virginia. In Duncan's Trustee v. Clay, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 48
(1877), the court held:
The first clause of this section was intended to place devisees or legatees, to whom
the testator does not stand in the relation of a parent, upon the same footing with
children or grandchildren, and to change the common-law rule to that extent. [A pre-
sumption in favor of satisfaction arose upon a gift by the testator to a child or to a
person to which the testator stands in loco parentis. E.g., Roberts v. Weatherford, 10
Ala. 72 (1846); Rodgers v. Reinking, 205 Iowa 1311, 217 N.W. 441 (1928).] The latter
clause further changes the common law so as to apply certain gifts to the satisfaction of
devises or legacies, whether specific or general, and whether for a fixed or an uncertain
sum. But this provision does not control unless it can be made to appear, from parol or
other evidence, that the testator intended, at the time it was made, it should be
deemed a satisfaction, partial or entire, of the devise or bequest contained in the previ-
ous will.
Id. at 51-52; accord Swinebroad v. Bright, 110 Ky. 616, 119 Ky. 684, 62 S.W. 484 (1901); see
also Traughber v. King, 235 Ky. 658, 32 S.W.2d 8 (1930); Stiffs Ex'r v. Stiff, 217 Ky. 716,
290 S.W. 718 (1927).
In contrast, the Virginia court in Harrison's Ex'r v. Harrison's Adm'r, 171 Va. 224, 198
S.E. 902 (1938), held that, despite the Kentucky holdings to the contrary, it was compelled
on the basis of the legislative history of the Virginia statute to raise a presumption in favor
of satisfaction for both devisees who were children of the testator and for other devisees and
that the reference to parol evidence in the statute merely authorized the court to admit
evidence showing testator's intent. See also In re Estate of Groves, 120 W. Va. 373, 198 S.E.
142 (1938).
Analagous to its position on advancements, the UPC adopts a writing requirement for
satisfactions:
Property which a testator gave in his lifetime to a person is treated as a satisfaction of
a devise to that person in whole or in part, only if the will provides for deduction of the
lifetime gift, or the testator declares in a contemporaneous writing that the gift is to be
deducted from the devise or is in satisfaction of the devise, or the devisee acknowledges
in writing that the gift is in satisfaction. For purpose of partial satisfaction, property
given during lifetime is valued as of the time the devisee came into possession or enjoy-
ment of the property or as of the time of death of the testator, whichever occurs first.
U.P.C. § 2-612 (1977).
The following state statutes currently require a writing to prove a satisfaction: ALA.
CODE §& 43-8-231 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.11.275 (1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2612
(1975); CAL. PROS. CODE § 1050 (West 1981), repealed by Probate Law & Procedure Act, ch.
842, § 44, 1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4491 (West) (effective Jan. 1, 1985), replaced by CAL. PROD.
CODE § 6174 (West Supp. 1984) (effective Jan. 1, 1985); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-11-612 (1973);
FLA. STAT. § 732.609 (1981); HAwAII REv. STAT. § 560:2-612 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-612
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litigation, relatively few cases concerning writings ex-
ist-suggesting by inference, that testators do not commonly exe-
cute these writings." Furthermore, a greater number of satisfac-
tions cases arises in states in which written proof of an intent to
make a satisfaction is not required.45 If decedents who are sophisti-
(1979); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-612 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 197, § 25A
(West Supp. 1984-85); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-612 (1982); Mo. REv. STAT. § 474.45 (Supp.
1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-515 (1983); NEB. REv. STAT. § 30-2350 (1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3B:3-46 (West 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-612 (1978); N.Y. EST. PoWEns &
TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.5 (McKinney 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-12 (1976); OKLA. STAT. tit.
84, § 185 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 29-6-14 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-612
(1978); WIS. STAT. § 853.19 (1981-82). Of these states, the following have adopted the lan-
guage found in UPC § '2-612: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California (most recent enactment;
varying from UPC by providing that value expressed in the required writing is conclusive),
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts (more limited than UPC by apply-
ing only to a pecuniary legacy), Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska (varying from
UPC by requiring a devisee's written acknowledgement to be contemporaneous with the
gift), New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah. New York and Wisconsin enacted
statutes that were substantially different than UPC § 2-612, but undoubtedly were influ-
enced by the UPC drafts published during the 1960's that imposed a writing requirement.
Act of Aug. 2, 1966, ch. 952, § 2-1.5, 1966 N.Y. Laws 2766; Act of Jan. 29, 1970, ch. 339, § 26,
1969 Wis. Laws 1116-17. Michigan enacted a new statute in 1979, the meaning of which is
not entirely clear: "Property which a testator gave in his lifetime to a devisee shall be
treated as a satisfaction of the devisee in whole or in part, if the will provides for deduction
of the lifetime gift." MICH. Comp. LAws § 700.139 (1979), enacted by Revised Probate Code
Act, No. 642, § 139, 1978 Mich. Pub. Acts 2470. This language could be interpreted as re-
quiring an express provision in the will to account for lifetime gifts before a gift could be
treated as a satisfaction. If so interpreted, this provision is the most restrictive of any found
in the United States. (Michigan has no advancements statute. See supra note 11.)
Interestingly, in jurisdictions that do not require a writing for satisfaction but do for
advancements, courts have referred to the writing requirement imposed in the advance-
ments statute as evidence of the state's policy not to find a satisfaction without convincing
evidence. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pridmore, 187 Ill. App. 301 (1914); see also Domzalski v.
Domzalski, 303 Mich. 103, 5 N.W.2d 672 (1942).
44. The following satisfactions cases decided in California concern the nature of the
writing- In re Estate of Crane, 6 Cal. 2d 218, 57 P.2d 476 (1936) (property settlement upon
separation of parties did not qualify as a sufficient writing for purposes of statute; spouse
allowed to take devise made to her under will); In re Estate of Baker, 168 Cal. 766, 145 P.
1005 (1914); Estate of Lackey, 17 Cal. App. 3d 247, 94 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1971).
45. The following satisfactions cases were decided in California after 1900: In re Es-
tate of Crane, 6 Cal. 2d 218, 57 P.2d 476 (1936); In re Estate of Baker, 168 Cal. 766, 145 P.
1005 (1914); Estate of Lackey, 17 Cal. App. 3d 247, 94 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1971). See also Estate
of Neathery, 142 Cal. App. 2d 769, 299 P.2d 292 (1956) (one of several reasons why the court
determined deeds given to devisee were not a satisfaction of a devise was that no writing
existed showing testator's intent to make a satisfaction). Other cases in California related to
the satisfactions doctrine concerned decedent's gifts to a pretermitted heir. See In re Estate
of Kretschmer, 232 Cal. App. 2d 789, 43 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1965); In re Estate of Rawnsley, 94
Cal. App. 2d 384, 210 P.2d 888 (1949). Other cases concerned ambiguous provisions in the
will directing that subsequent gifts or loans be taken into account upon distribution of the
estate. See Estate of Nielsen, 169 Cal. App. 2d 297, 337 P.2d 87 (1959); In re Estate of
Brown, 22 Cal. App. 2d 480, 71 P.2d 345 (1937); In re Estate of Dodge, 9 Cal. App. 2d 650,
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cated enough to execute wills are unaware of the satisfaction writ-
ing requirement, then the assumption that a decedent who did not
execute a will would execute an advancements writing is hardly
reasonable.
Thus, only two satisfactory explanations for the reduced litiga-
tion in jurisdictions requiring a writing remain: either decedents no
longer intend lifetime gifts to be considered upon dis-
tribution of their estates, or decedents are making lifetime gifts,
but without an accompanying writing. If the former hypothesis is
correct, the doctrine is no longer relevant to the distribution of in-
testate estates and should be repealed. If the latter hypothesis is
correct, the writing requirement eliminates any effect the ad-
vancements doctrine may have on the distribution of intestate es-
tates by repealing the doctrine for all practical purposes.
Many reasons support the actions of the nineteenth century
lawmakers in adopting the writing requirement as a device to con-
trol litigation concerning the advancements doctrine. During the
nineteenth century intestacy was much more common and litiga-
tion concerning advancements much more burdensome. Legisla-
tures might have hoped that a writing accompanying an advance-
ment would become general practice. They might have believed
that a sufficient number of decedents would execute a writing to
justify continuing the advancements doctrine in this restricted
form so as to further these decedents' intentions. The modern leg-
islatures in these states, however, can be criticized for not recon-
sidering the wisdom of retaining the advancements doctrine in this
restricted form. Their inaction can be attributed to a fact of legis-
lative life during the last century in this country-"getting a stat-
ute enacted in the first place is much easier than getting the stat-
ute revised so that it will make sense in the light of changed
conditions. '4 6 Also contributing to the present day inaction is the
imprimatur received by these statutes from the National Commis-
sioners when they promulgated UPC section 2-110 in 1969.47 Now
that the writing requirement is the preferred and modern resolu-
tion of the advancements doctrine problem, state legislatures are
hardly likely to recognize that their advancements statutes have
become outmoded.
50 P.2d 839 (1935). Compare the above cited cases with the large number of satisfactions
cases reported in New York after 1900. See supra note 14.
46. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 95.
47. See 1969 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNrTED
STATE LAWS 101-06.
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Unlike the drafters of the nineteenth century advancements
statutes, the UPC drafters had considerable evidence at the time
they adopted the writing requirement for advancements showing
that advancements litigation was no longer burdensome on the
courts and that the imposition of a writing requirement for ad-
vancements was likely to have the practical effect of abolishing the
doctrine. Thus, the critical question is why the drafters retained
formal recognition of the doctrine of advancements in the Code,
while adopting a procedural rule that effectively repealed that doc-
trine.48 If they believed, as stated in their commentary, 9 that dece-
dents no longer make advancements, then the drafters should have
abolished the doctrine along with the other anachronisms that they
found in the law of succession, such as the unequal treatment of
halfbloods.50
A simple and attractive explanation for the sleight of hand
treatment of advancements in the Code is that the advancements
issue was of minor importance compared to the other matters the
drafters addressed in Article II. These matters included a new in-
testate succession statute,51 a new will execution procedure,52 and
greater protection for the spouse in common-law states against dis-
inheritance accomplished through lifetime transfers.53 The expla-
nation that the drafters did little more than select among existing
statutory enactments and borrow a provision they considered satis-
factory is contradicted, however, by the carefully deliberated terms
of UPC section 2-110. Among the improvements made by the
drafters was the elimination of an ambiguity found in many ex-
isting statutes" under which an advancement could be shown if
"expressed in [such] gift or grant" or if "charged in writing by the
intestate.'5 Unlike many existing statutes,58 the UPC expanded
48. The same question can be asked of the drafters of the New York statutory provi-
sion. The commentary to N.Y. EsT. Powans & TRusTs LAw § 2-1.5 (McKinney 1981) cites
difficulties of litigation as the reason the drafters imposed the writing requirement. By 1966,
however, when this statutory provision was enacted, advancements litigation no longer ap-
peared to be a problem. See supra notes 13, 33; Act of Aug. 2, 1966, ch. 952, § 2-1.5, 1966
N.Y. Laws 2766.
49. U.P.C. § 2-110 Comment (1977).
50. Id. § 2-107.
51. Id. § 2-101 to -114.
52. Id. § 2-501 to -513.
53. Id. § 2-201 to -207.
54. This ambiguity can be traced to the Massachusetts statute of 1806. See supra note
30.
55. Id.
56. See supra note 10.
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the class of persons eligible to receive advancements from children
or lineal descendants of the decedent to all the decedent's heirs. 57
The drafters also clearly stated that an advancement does not bind
the lineal descendants of a recipient of an advancement who pre-
deceased the decedent. Frequently, existing statutes either left this
issue unaddressed or legislatures adopted a contrary rule.5 8 In sum,
57. Presumably, the drafters did this because the evidence showing an intent to make
an advancement was made more stringent by the writing requirement.
58. The following jurisdictions do not address by statute the question of whether lin-
eal descendants of the advancee are bound by an advancement: D.C. CODE ANN. § 19.319
(1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-1-17 (1972); R.L GEN. LAws § 33-1-11 (1969); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 31-702 (1977); see also VA. CODE § 64.1-17 (1980); W. VA. CODE § 42-4-1 (1982) (both
providing that the advancee "or any descendant of his" shall be bound). When the statute
does not speak to the representation issue, the courts have based their decisions on a techni-
cal analysis. According to the courts, whether the advancement continues to be taken into
account in the distribution of the probate estate depends upon how the shares passing to
the substitute takers for the advancee are determined under the intestate succession statute
and the representational system adopted by the state. If the substitute taker's share of the
estate is the share, or a portion of the share, that would have otherwise passed to the prede-
ceased advancee, then the substitute taker will be required to account for the advancement.
E.g., Wilson's Heirs v. Wilson's Adm'r, 18 Ala. 176 (1850); Towles v. Roundtree, 10 Fla. 299
(1863-1864); Nelson's Heirs v. Bush's Adm'r, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 104 (1839); Dilley v. Love, 61
Md. 603 (1884); Estate of Williams, 62 Mo. App. 339 (1895); Park's Estate, 4 Pa. C. 560
(1887); Eshleman's Appeal, 74 Pa. 42 (1873); Hughes's Appeal, 57 Pa. 179 (1868); McClure
v. Steel, 14 Rich. Eq. 105 (S.C. 1868); Flesher v. Mitchell, 5 W. Va. 59 (1871); see also
Simpson v. Simpson, 114 Ill. 603, 4 N.E. 137, 7 N.E. 287 (1885) (statute expressly provided
for this result); McRae v. McRae, 3 Bradf. 199 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1855) (statute expressly pro-
vided for this result); cf. Beebe v. Estabrook, 79 N.Y. 246 (1879) (court held that a
grandchild could claim benefit of advancements when the decedent was survived by sons
and a grandchild, who was the child of a predeceased daughter). The substitute taker is said
to be sharing in the probate estate by "representation" of the advancee and, therefore,
bound by the advancement made to the advancee rather than receiving a share of the estate
"directly" from the decendent. The following cases hold that persons taking directly from
the decedent are not bound by advancements made to their ancestors: Brown v. Taylor, 62
Ind. 295 (1878); Skinner v. Wynne, 55 N.C. (2 Jones Eq.) 41 (1854); Person's Appeal, 74 Pa.
121 (1873).
MPC section 29(c) requires the advancement to be taken into account by the persons
who take from the decedent and who were also heirs of the advancee. That these persons do
not take by representation through the advancee is irrelevant.
Death of Advancee before intestate. If the advancee dies before the intestate, leaving a
lineal heir who takes from the intestate, the advancement shall be taken into account
in the same manner as if it had been made directly to such heir. If such heir is entitled
to a lesser share in the estate than the advancee would have been entitled had he
survived the intestate, then the heir shall only be charged with such proportion of the
advancement as the amount he would have inherited, had there been no advancement,
bears to the amount which the advancee would have inherited, had there been no
advancement.
M.P.C. § 29(c) (1946). Although this statutory provision contains ambiguities, the comments
to the section clarify the drafters' intent to have the advancee's lineal descendants account
for the advancement even though they took directly from the decedent rather than by rep-
resentation through the advancee. (The term "lineal heirs" is not defined in the MPC. Pre-
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UPC section 2-110 is a unique advancements statute that demon-
strates a thoughtful consideration of advancement problems and,
hence, makes any "short shrift" explanation untenable.
A more likely explanation for the UPC's retention of the doc-
trinal cloak of advancements is the common-law tradition-a tra-
dition that provides lawyers the sense of security and certainty of
the past and, at the same time, promises reform that will provide
an adequate response to changing circumstances. The drafters did
not seize the opportunity to overthrow the existing doctrine simply
because such action is unfamiliar and uncomfortable to the com-
mon-law lawyer. This common-law tradition also helps explain the
drafters' reliance on statutory precedent when promulgating their
own reform. 9 Thus, habit of thinking led the drafters to conceal,
in the common-law tradition, their repeal of the advancements
doctrine.
The legislative transplantation of common-law decisionmaking
devices to statutory drafting results, in part, from law school
sumably the drafters were referring to the advancee's lineal descendants.) Accord CAL.
PROB. CODE § 1053 (West 1981), repealed by Probate Law & Procedure Act, ch. 842, § 47,
1983 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4491 (West) (effective Jan. 1, 1985) (CAL. PROB. CODE § 6409(d) (West
Supp. 1984) (effective Jan. 1, 1985) follows the UPC); IND. CODE § 29-1-2-10(c) (1982); IowA
CODE § 633.226 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-510 (1983); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 3-
105(c) (1974) (language could be judicially interpreted to adopt case law rationale of repre-
sentation: "If the recipient of the property fails to survive the decedent, the property shall
be taken into account in computing the share of the issue of the recipient."); NRV. REV.
STAT. § 151.150 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-27 (1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 227 (1981); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 112.155 (1981) (Oregon has the clearest statutory language of any existing
statute: "If the recipient of the property advanced fails to survive the decedent, the amount
of the advancement shall be taken into account in computing the share of the issue of the
recipient, whether or not the issue take by representation."); S.D. CODiFrD LAws ANN. § 29-
1-21 (1976); Tmx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 44 (Vernon 1980); WAsH. REv. CODE § 11.04.041 (1983);
Wis. STAT. § 852.11(2) (1981-82).
Other states have codified the case law in their advancements statutes and require the
advancement to be taken into account by the persons taking as representatives of the ad-
vancee. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-274(a) (1983); GA. CODE § 53-4-51(a) (1981); ILL. RaV.
STAT. ch. 110'h, § 2-5(a) (1983); Ky. REv. STAT. § 391.140(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1240 (West 1952); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 561:13 (1974); N.Y. EST.
PowzRs & TRusTS LAW § 2-1.5(c) (McKinney 1981); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-60 (Law. Co-op.
1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-110 (1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1726 (1974). The follow-
ing language of the Massachusetts statute, though ambiguous, appears to adopt the repre-
sentation analysis:
If a child or other lineal descendant who has received an advancement dies before the
intestate, leaving issue, the advancement shall be considered as part of the intestate's
estate in the division and distribution of such estate, and the value thereof shall be
taken by the representative of the heir to whom the advancement was made toward
his share of the estate, as if the advancement had been made directly to him.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 196, § 7 (West 1958) (emphasis addded).
59. See Horack, supra note 32; Riesenfeld, supra note 32.
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teaching methods based on the Langdellian tradition of case analy-
sis.60 The finest legal scholars and lawyers, who have become lead-
ing law reformers, receive better training to become appellate
judges than to become statutory drafters because of the continuing
emphasis in our law schools on analyzing legal opinions rather than
legislative materials. Critics see the problem in the law schools as
broader than merely the emphasis on court-made law. Professor
Rodell would attribute the use of subterfuge techniques in statu-
tory drafting to legal training emphasizing linguistic manipula-
tion."1 After acquiring the jargon and the mental agility, law stu-
dents are no longer able to think about a problem in a direct
way-instead, they think in terms of "complicated intellectual
riddles." 62
Another reason the common-law technique of concealing
change is attractive is that this technique provides lawmakers with
the sense that they are not making a rash or major deviation from
existing laws.63 As for all aspects of human conduct, fear of innova-
60. Christopher Columbus Langdell, the first dean of Harvard Law School, is generally
credited for establishing the "science of law." See A. SuTHmmRAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD ch.
6 (1967).
61. F. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAwyESs! 14-15, 138-50 (2d ed. 1957). But see Page,
Statutes as Common Law Principles, 1944 Wis. L. Rav. 175, 175-76.
62. There is no more pointed demonstration of the chasm between ordinary human
thinking and the mental processes of the lawyer than in the almost universal reaction
of law students when they first encounter The Law. They come to law school.a nor-
mally intelligent, normally curious, normally receptive group. Day in and day out they
are subjected to the legal lingo of judges, textbook writers, professors-those learned in
The Law. But for months none of it clicks; there seems to be nothing to take hold of.
Eventually their confusion, founded though it is in stubborn and healthy skepticism,
is worn down. Eventually they succumb to the barrage of principles and concepts and
all the metaphysical refinements that go with them. And once they have learned to talk
the jargon, once they have forgotten their recent insistence on matter-of-factness, once
they have begun to glory in their own agility at that mental hocus-pocus that had them
befuddled a short while ago, then they have become, in the most important sense, law-
yers. Now they, too, have joined the select circle of those who can weave a complicated
intellectual riddle out of something so mundane as a strike or an automobile accident.
Now it will be hard if not impossible ever to bring them back to that disarmingly direct
way of thinking about the problems of people and society which they used to share
with the average man before they fell in with the lawyers and swallowed The Law.
F. RODLL, supra note 61, at 14-15.
63. The largest changes have never been deliberate. Even when large consequences
follow from a legislative act, one can be sure that they were not intended. The legisla-
tor addresses a problem small enough to be identified: what may happen is that the
current of events catches on his remedy and produces a larger diverson. The current
may catch on anything. Its force is that of clients coming to lawyers with what seems to
common sense like a case, although the law is against them. All the lawyer can do for
one hit by a rule is to look for a way round it, make a distinction, bring some new idea
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tion and a natural conservative bias is prominent in law reform.
Even law reformers who are receptive to innovation nevertheless
may draft legislation in a manner that makes changes from ex-
isting law appear less dramatic in an effort to alleviate these con-
cerns for other persons participating in the legislative process. This
attitude is certainly in the American law tradition," in which pub-
lic expectations require the law, whether judicially or legislatively
created, not to change quickly or abruptly.6 5 Understanding the
political constraints on law reform provides further insight into the
lawmakers' use of language to make changes appear minor and well
to bear. If he succeeds, the rule is formally unimpaired. If the route that the special
facts of his client's case enabled him to take can be used by others, the result may be
reversed, but the rule remains. Even when it is abolished or forgotten, its shape will be
seen in the twisting route by which it was circumvented. And the ideas he has imported
will prove their own strength. The first resort to them may have been artificial; but
their natural properties will assert themselves, and consequences may follow as far-
reaching as the ecological disturbances produced by alien animals or plants.
S. Mmsom, HIsTomcAL FOUNDATIONS OF TM COMMON LAw 6 (2d ed. 1981).
64. Law, by and large, evolves; it changes in piecemeal fashion. Revolutions in es-
sential structure are few and far between. That at least is the Anglo-American experi-
ence. Some of the old is preserved among the mass of the new.
But what is kept of old law is highly selective. Society in change may be slow, but it
is ruthless. Neither evolution nor revolution is sentimental Old rules of law and old
legal institutions stay alive when they still have a purpose-or, at least, when they do
not interfere with the demands of current life.
L. FREDMAN, supra note 27, at 14.
An equally universal characteristic of the rational judicial process is that its rules
must be given to it or be found by rational derivation from other rules. This is not, as
was once thought, a simple deductive process from a set of rules given once and for all
by statute, precedents of ultimately unknown origin, or natural law, or any combina-
tion of these. Rather there is creative evolution of rules, but like biological creation, the
new rules must have parents and ancestors and survive only if viable in the environ-
ment for which they are proposed or are applied. In this respect the legislative process
has broader sources, for while it too must generate its products on a rational basis, it is
not confined internally within the system of rules already extant in the legislative sys-
tem, although it is most likely to build on what already exists there.
Breitel, supra note 2, at 773.
65. The legislative process by its own internal traditions, as well as its external po-
litical necessities, is also controlled by precedents, traditions and rationalistic consider-
ations. This is true in the area of public law. It is dramatically true in the area of
private law.
A legislature, adopting a new lien law, a uniform commercial code, or a statute quali-
fying the automatic renewal clause in real estate leases, will look, to much the same
extent as the courts, to the body of the law, decisional and statutory, for precedents,
consistency, the effect on policy factors, and the satisfaction of the reasonable expecta-
tions of the community. It does so in a different way, no doubt. But the fact that it
does respond to these influences shows how much a continuum the lawmaking process
is, regardless of the political organ that undertakes the task. It is only true in theory
that a legislature may enact any law it wishes, subject alone to the Constitution.
Breitel, supra note 2, at 760.
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within legal precedent. 66
Benefits can be derived from the common-law tradition in
which law reformers purport to retain old legal institutions. First,
in some rare cases, the drafters can better achieve the desired re-
sult by indirection. Professor Calabresi explains this linguistic phe-
nomenon best through an example. He argues that if we forth-
rightly admit that the state can regulate religion, psychologically,
we are more likely to allow such regulation than if we say that reg-
ulation of religion cannot exist and then periodically define behav-
ior by some cults as not religious and hence subject to regulation. 7
In particular, Professor Calabresi points to the refusal to permit
polygamy among Mormons in the nineteenth century.65 He states
that this refusal "was certainly regulation of religion, but the de-
nial that it was such regulation may have lessened the impact of
the decision and led to less regulation of religion than would have
followed from an 'honest' admission that some religious beliefs are
in practice subject to state prohibition."69 Unless conflicting funda-
mental rights are at stake, use of subterfuge and imprecise lan-
guage seldom can be justified.
A second benefit of indirect statutory change is that a court
always will be able to revert to the prior law if presented with a
particularly egregious case. Thus, the change only takes place after
"court-testing" of the reform against factual disputes.70 When
drafters import common-law subterfuge techniques into a statute,
judicial activism is encouraged because courts are given the oppor-
tunity to restrict, or even to reject, the change.7 ' In Bransford v.
66. That is not to say, however, that the perceived necessity to travel a serpentine
route at a snail's pace is not frustrating to a law reformer.
The Law is the killy-loo bird of the sciences. The killy-loo, of course, was the bird
that insisted on flying backward because it didn't care where it was going but was
mightily interested in where it had been. And certainly The Law, when it moves at all,
does so by flapping clumsily and uncertainly along, with its eye unswervingly glued on
what lies behind.... Only The Law, inexorably devoted to all its most ancient princi-
ples and precedents, makes a vice of innovation and a virtue of hoariness. Only The
Law resists and resents the notion that it should ever change its antiquated ways to
meet the challenge of a changing world.
F. RoDriL, supra note 61, at 20; see also S. MILsoM, supra note 63, at 6-7.
67. G. CALABREi, supra note 1, at 173.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Cf. id. at 178. ("The pressure to use subterfuges ... can also come from a desire
in situations of uncertainty to slow down change until we are sure we want it.").
71. The judicial activism suggested here is consistent with a restrictive view of the
judicial function in construing statutes.
Whether a judge does violence to language in its total context is not always free from
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Crawford,72 a good example of this court-testing, the Georgia Su-
preme Court rejected the writing requirement reform for advance-
ments. In Bransford a granddaughter of the decedent claimed her
right to share in the estate along with the other lineal descendants
of the decedent. The lower state court refused to admit testimony
concerning conversations taking place years after a transfer in
which the decedent indicated that money lent to the grand-
daughter's father, who had since died, was intended to be an ad-
vancement on his inheritance. The granddaughter's share of the
estate would have been reduced if the administrator of the estate
proved that the money lent was an advancement .7  The Georgia
Supreme Court refused to interpret the applicable statute as pre-
cluding proof of the decedent's intent to make an advancement if
such proof was not in writing.74 Despite the weak evidence showing
the decedent's intention to make an advancement and the statu-
tory preference for a writing, the court was unwilling to exclude
the evidence and take the advancement question of fact away from
the jury when the possible result would be unequal treatment of
lineal descendants. 5
A final benefit of continuing the doctrinal cloak to conceal leg-
islative reform is that the analogy to similar doctrines remains ob-
vious; therefore, courts are more likely to extend the adopted re-
form to these other doctrines. For example, a court, referring to a
jurisdiction's advancements statute that requires a writing, might
require a writing to prove a contract for the release of inheritance
rights between an heir and the decedent, 6 or, alternatively, might
doubt. Statutes come out of the past and aim at the future. They may carry implicit
residues or mere hints of purpose. Perhaps the most delicate aspect of statutory con-
struction is not to find more residues than are implicit nor purposes beyond the bound
of hints. Even for a judge most sensitive to the traditional limitation of his function,
this is a matter for judgment not always easy of answer. But a line does exist between
omission and what Holmes called "misprision or abbreviation that does not conceal the
purpose." Judges may differ as to the point at which the line should be drawn, but the
only sure safeguard against crossing the line between adjudication and legislation is an
alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained,
reluctance to do so.
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. Rnv. 527, 535
(1947) (footnote omitted).
72. 51 Ga. 20 (1874).
73. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
74. 51 Ga. at 22 ("As to section 2580, Code, prescribing that a certain act... 'shall be
evidence of the fact of an advancement,' . . . it cannot, of course, be claimed that it was
intended to declare that to be the only way in which it could be proved.").
75. Id.
76. The UPC drafters considered a provision on release, but decided that no provision
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require clear and convincing proof of the contract.7 7 A court would
reason that unless the degree of proof for release is raised, trans-
fers that fail as advancements for lack of a writing would remain
effective under the release doctrine and the statute would not have
accomplished its intended result.7 8 This judicial merging of a stat-
utory solution into other common-law areas reflects the interrela-
tionships between statutes and the common law.7 9 By purporting
to retain a legal rule, doctrine, or institution in the statute, a legis-
lature further nurtures and facilitates "conglomerate mergers of ju-
dicial rules and statutes."80
For whatever purpose or benefits law reformers conceal their
reforms by purporting to continue doctrines that they are in fact
rejecting, the cost of this drafting technique is high. First, this
technique can contribute to self-deception. Despite their assertions
was necessary.
Release. A section following this section in the 1967 Summer Draft (Second Work-
ing Draft) dealt with the subject of release. After further discussion the Reporters de-
cided that no reference in the Code to releases was necessary. A release in favor of a
third person which is executed for consideration should be effective as a contract for
the benefit of a third person. A written release to the decedent for consideration can be
effectuated, at least to some extent, as an advancement. In other situations it seems
preferable to compel the decedent to state his intention concerning the effect to be
given to a release in a duly executed will. Renunciation by an heir is dealt with in
section 2-801.
NATONAL CoNFRENcz OF CoMMIssIONERS ON UNORM STATE LAws, SEcoND TENTATmvE
DnRT (Fourth Working Draft) OF UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, § 2-113, Comments, at 29
(1968).
77. Cf., e.g., In re Estate of Pridmore, 187 Il1. App. 301 (1914) (writing requirement in
advancements statute influenced court to require clear and convincing evidence of testator's
intent to make a satisfaction); Domzalski v. Domzalski, 303 Mich. 103, 5 N.W.2d 672 (1942).
78. See Traynor, supra note 6, at 416-19, for examples of instances in which the court
has looked to a statutory solution in a related area as the basis for developing a common law
remedy.
79.
A statute may be a fat code or a thin paragraph or a starveling sentence. It may cast a
heavy shadow on the common law or a light one, or it may idly plane until some inci-
dent sends it careening into action. The hydraheaded problem is how to synchronize
the unguided missiles launched by legislatures with a going system of common law.
Sometimes a statute examined close to the weathered textures of the common law
reveals so marked a kinship to existing or readily forseeable judicial rules as to facili-
tate its recognition as a source of common law. Sometimes a statute serves to reveal a
gap or aberration in the common law even though it does not itself provide a remedy,
and thus affords a basis for judicial correction within the common law. One way or
another, the rising lines of statutes and of judicial precedents are likely at times to
converge. It is not realistic, if it ever was, to view them as parallel lines.
Id. at 402. See generally Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. Rav. 113, 117 (1921)
(The author begs for legislation that sets judges free to develop and expand the law by
"analogy and custom and utility and justice.").
80. Traynor, supra note 6, at 403.
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to the contrary,81 the UPC drafters may have believed that dece-
dents make lifetime gifts intending that they be taken into account
in the distribution of the intestate estate. Nevertheless, the policy
favoring advancements presented difficult evidentiary questions
and forced the drafters to adopt and justify the writing require-
ment. In other words, UPC section 2-110 may reflect accurately the
drafters' ambivalence. If the drafters, however, had understood
clearly that they were abolishing the advancements doctrine with
this statutory reform, they may have searched for alternative
solutions.82
A second related cost is that the subterfuge techniques may
also deceive supporters of the legislation. Drafters who initiate a
change, but conceal its impact in legal jargon, can make a proposed
reform look modest and unimportant as well as contribute to mis-
understandings about its effect. Undoubtedly, the drafters of the
UPC constantly were balancing the advantages of a proposed inno-
vation against the possibility that their work would be viewed as
too radical. A statute considered radical would fail to obtain the
necessary support of the National Commissioners, the legislatures,
and the bar and bench in general. A proposal that theoretically
may be sound but that is rejected as too radical is far less benefi-
cial than a more modest reform that enjoys widespread enactment.
Nevertheless, the misconceptions created by subterfuge techniques
are difficult to justify as a necessary part of the political process,'
especially in such a noncontroversial area.
A third cost of retaining formal recognition of a doctrine oth-
erwise being rejected is that the statutory language inevitably will
be broad enough to be the basis for claims that the lawmakers pre-
sumably had intended to eliminate. Assuming that the drafters be-
lieved the doctrine of advancements to be an anachronism, con-
sider the following hypothetical: A court is presented with an
informal letter by a parent to a child accompanying a gift of money
that discusses the child's forthcoming marriage or career move
without specifically indicating the parent's desire to treat the gift
as an advance on the child's inheritance. Other children of the de-
cedent claim that the letter satisfies the writing requirement. A
sympathetic court, relying on the maxim that statutes in deroga-
tion of the common law should be interpreted strictly,3 easily
81. U.P.C. § 2-110 Comments (1977).
82. See infra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fields, 185 Ind. 230, 233, 113 N.E.
756, 757 (1916) (refusing to interpret a statute as changing the common law's refusal to
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could agree that the writing requirement was satisfied. Disap-
pointed heirs have yet to present this type of case to the courts.8 4
Nevertheless, the potential for such litigation exists, especially in
light of the increased popularity of will substitutes. Will substi-
tutes, broadly defined, are those transfer devices that permit a per-
son significant control over the property during life while providing
for the disposition of the property when the owner dies.85 The pop-
ularity of will substitutes increases the incentive for estate holders
to make lifetime transfers. Thus, the popularity of will substitutes
coupled with ambiguous advancements statutes enhances the like-
lihood of litigation with respect to these types of transfers.
A fourth cost of the formal retention of outmoded doctrines is
the transformation of the law into a labyrinth of confusing and
complex rules that only those persons well-trained in the "science"
of law can solve. Legislative retention of old rules, even if only in
form, tends to minimize the amount of retraining necessary for the
present generation of lawyers. This perceived benefit, unfortu-
award attorney's fees to insureds); Lichtman v. Nadler, 74 A.D.2d 66, 69, 426 N.Y.S.2d 628,
631 (1980) (refusing to interpret a statute as creating a cause of action for private nuisance
when none exists at common law).
84. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 100, which discusses the popularity of various types of will substi-
tutes. Examples of will substitutes include life insurance policies, joint tenancy deeds, paya-
ble-on-death accounts, joint bank accounts, and Totten trusts.
The applicability of the doctrine of advancements to will substitutes is unsettled. The
primary issue presented to the courts is whether will substitute transfers can be the subject
of advancements. Some courts have held that an advancement can only exist if decedent has
made an unconditional gift to the advancee. E.g., Albers v. Young, 119 Colo. 37, 41, 199 P.2d
890, 892 (1948) (joint bank account); Berry v. Berry, 208 Ga. 285, 290, 66 S.E.2d 336, 340
(1951) (U.S. Savings bonds held in co-ownership with right of survivorship); Thornton v.
Thornton, 39 Tenn. App. 225, 237, 282 S.W.2d 361, 367 (1955) (transfer to wife for life, then
to decedent if decedent still alive, but if not to child). This "unconditional gift" test for an
advancement should be rejected. Other courts have applied the doctrine of advancements to
will substitutes. See, e.g., Brodrick v. Moore, 226 F.2d 105, 108 (10th Cir. 1955) (U.S. Sav-
ings bonds held in co-ownership with right of survivorship); Culberhouse v. Culberhouse, 68
Ark. 405, 408, 59 S.W. 38, 39 (1900) (life insurance); In re Estate of Lee, 170 Colo. 419, 424,
462 P.2d 492, 494 (1969) (joint tenancy with right of survivorship); Popplewell v. Flanagan,
244 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Ky. 1951) (retained life estate for benefit of decedent); Thompson v.
Latimer, 209 Ky. 491, 495, 273 S.W. 65, 66 (1925) (life insurance); Vinson v. Vinson, 105 La.
30, 33, 29 So. 701, 702 (1901) (life insurance); Parrish v. Adams, 10 N.C. App. 700, 702, 179
S.E.2d 880 (1971) (retained life estate for benefit of decedent and his wife); Houston Estate,
383 Pa. 466, 469, 119 A.2d 304, 306 (1956) (retained life estate for benefit of decedent);
Rickenbacker v. Zimmerman, 10 S.C. 110 (1877) (life insurance). Property transferred by a
will substitute is not part of the probate estate and not subject to the intestate succession
statute. If the transfer is not treated as an advancement, then the transferee will receive an
intestate share undiminished by the value of the property received through a will substitute
that will be equal to or in the same proportion to the other intestate succession takers: this
is the very result the doctrine was designed to avoid.
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nately, often prevails over the costs to society of unnecessary intri-
cacies.86 A goal of codification should be to demystify the law so
that it may better serve the citizenry. 7 If repeal of the advance-
ments doctrine was its purpose, UPC section 2-110 failed, by its
indirection, to clarify the law."8
86. Of course, we can never eliminate ambiguities in legislation, but statutes can be
upgraded with improvements in the legislative process.
Anything that is written may present a problem of meaning, and that is the essence of
the business of judges in construing legislation. The problem derives from the very
nature of words. They are symbols of meaning. But unlike mathematical symbols, the
phrasing of a document, especially a complicated enactment, seldom attains more than
approximate precision. If individual words are inexact symbols, with shifting variables,
their configuration can hardly achieve invariant meaning or assured definiteness. Apart
from the ambiguity inherent in its symbols, a statute suffers from dubieties. It is not an
equation or a formula representing a clearly marked process, nor is it an expression of
individual thought to which is imparted the definiteness a single authorship can give. A
statute is an instrument of government partaking of its practical purposes but also of
its infirmities and limitations, of its awkward and groping efforts. With one of his
flashes of insight, Mr. Justice Johnson called the science of government "the science of
experiment." The phrase, uttered a hundred and twenty-five years ago, has a very
modern ring, for time has only served to emphasize its accuracy. To be sure, laws can
measurably be improved with improvement in the mechanics of legislation, and the
need for interpretation is usually in inverse ratio to the care and imagination of drafts-
men. The area for judicial construction may be contracted. A large area is bound to
remain.
Frankfurter, supra note 71, at 528 (footnote omitted).
87. F. RODELL, supra note 61, at 8. "[W]e cannot die and leave our property to our
children without calling on the lawyers to guide us. To guide us, incidentally, through a
maze of confusing gestures and formalities that lawyers have created." Id.
Then, too, in the older cities of the State, among the old men, the oldest and best
lawyers, who were worked gray in the profession, there was a strong cleaving to the
friendly old forms in the use of which they did, or were supposed to excel It was hard
for such men to forego a superiority, well and laboriously earned, and to be compelled
to begin again by the side of the youth just immerging into the legal arena, with whose
sweat, and blood, and scars, these veterans were so gallantly mantled. For these men
had not learned then, what they have since-that the new system was the old system
shorn only of its nonsense, and that no lesson learned in the logic or philosophy of the
old, but applied as well to the new.
REPORT OF THE CODE CoMIussIoNERs TO THE EIGHTH GaENR.AL AssEMaLY OF THE STATE OF
IOWA 191 (1859).
88. The indirection inherent in UPC section 2-110 may be characteristic of the statu-
tory indirection criticized by Professor Rodell:
[A] statute which reads like a stone wall to the layman becomes, for the corporation
lawyer, a triumphal arch. It is, in short, a language that nobody but a lawyer
understands.
It is this fact more than any other-the fact that lawyers can't or won't tell
what they are about in ordinary English-that is responsible for the hopelessness of
the non-lawyer in trying to cope with or understand the so-called science of law. For
the lawyers' trade is a trade built entirely on words. And so long as the lawyers care-
fully keep to themselves the key to what those words mean, the only way the average
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A final cost of retaining formal recognition of an obsolete doc-
trine is that the lawmakers are more likely to fail to create a coher-
ent and logical statutory framework to provide adequate guidelines
to the courts for deciding new, and as yet unforeseeable, issues. 9
Consider how the advancements statute, UPC section 2-110, re-
lates to the UPC in general. The UPC mandates that statutes
should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Code's un-
derlying policies.90 The advancements statute, however, makes
these policies ambiguous. The Code, for example, contains a stat-
ute detailing the formalities necessary for execution of a valid
will e1 and a statutory estate plan in the absence of the proper exe-
cution of a will. e2 The advancements statute, however, permits an
informal writing to vary the statutory estate plan. A court might
excuse this inconsistency as idiosyncratic. When comparing the
historical rules relating to the advancements doctrine and the stat-
ute, a court would understand the advancements statute to be a
"tightening" rather than a "loosening" of requirements to vary the
statutory estate plan."3 Nevertheless, by its terms, the advance-
ments statute remains a crack in the formalities armor of the law
of succession and permits a sympathetic court, assisted by an ag-
gressive litigator, to admit extrinsic evidence to reform will provi-
sions, to move toward merely substantial compliance with will exe-
cution formalities, and to promote a greater leniency in recognizing
informal lifetime arrangements as valid despite their testamentary
character. Ironically, but in a sense predictably, an anchor in the
common-law doctrines could become the basis for dramatic change.
The costs of concealing reform in the common-law tradition
are significant. The risks of self-deception, misconception, failure
to accomplish statutory purpose, increased complexity of the law,
and failure to provide coherent guidelines to courts for deciding
unforseen issues almost always outweigh the benefits of subter-
man can find out what is going on is to become a lawyer, or at least to study law,
himself. All of which makes it very nice-and very secure-for the lawyers.
F. RODE L, supra note 61, at 11-12.
89. See G. GLmmoRE, supra note 1, at 41-67. Professor Gilmore describes and critiques
the attempts of Blackstone, Langdell, and their followers to unify areas of the law through
broad doctrines and, thereby, create the "true" body of law that would lead to predictability
and certainty where chaos had otherwise prevailed. Id.
90. See U.P.C. § 1-102 (1977).
91. Id. §§ 2-502 to -503.
92. Id. §§ 2-102 to -103.
93. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
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fuge.94 The burden to show the converse must be placed on those
who argue for misdirection.
The foregoing analysis does not intend to suggest that old in-
stitutions, rules, or doctrines should not remain an integral part of
new statutory provisions. On the contrary, as Dean Pound, former
dean of Harvard Law School, articulated in an address to the
American Bar Association, only a genuine anachronism that is not
actually or potentially a useful legal institution, rule, or doctrine
should be eliminated. Pound warned against viewing the law as a
science based on deduction "from the dogma which the legal sys-
tem takes for its foundation,"9 but at the same time he urged crit-
ics not to be too quick to conclude that a law is anachronistic. 7
Pound's cautionary message is particularly relevant to the ad-
vancements doctrine. As explained before, the intestacy scheme is
designed to accomplish a distribution of the probate estate that
reflects the probable dispository intent of most intestate- dece-
dents.' 8 The advancements doctrine, which extends the distribu-
tional scheme of the intestacy statute beyond the probate estate to
encompass lifetime transfers of wealth, assumes that intestate de-
cedents did not intend by lifetime transfers to reject the distribu-
94.
Without honesty and candor we cannot even know where we are. If we do not speak
precisely and describe as openly as we can what we are trying to do in all those cases
where basic conflicts are not at stake, then even the statement of ideals in categori-
cal terms in those basic conflicts will sound hollow and false. We will have made the
language of fiction and aspirations our common currency, and we will not be able to
reserve it for those few situations where it, and it alone, can slow us down and help
us preserve our conflicting ideals.
G. CALABREsI, supra note 1, at 180.
95. Dean Pound explained the doctrine of anachronisms: "Looked at historically, the
reasons which gave it birth may have wholly disappeared. Looked at analytically, it may not
fit nicely into the logical scheme of the time. Looked at functionally, however, it does not
always follow that we have an anachronism." Pound, supra note 6, at 142.
96. Id. at 143.
In the past this needless forcing of justice into crooked and narrow paths was often
justified as a scientific process. But there is nothing scientific in such a proceeding. The
science that calls therefore, is a false science. For legal science must be the science of
achieving the ends of law through law. In the modem state law takes on a scientific
character in order to accomplish its ends fully, equally and exactly. It is not scientific
for the sake of science. The jurist of today must judge it by the results it achieves, not
by the niceties of its internal structure. He must value its institutions, rules and doc-
trines by the extent to which they serve the ends of law, not by the beauty of the
logical processes by which they are deduced or the strictness with which they follow
from the dogma which the legal system takes for its foundation.
Id. at 143; see also id. at 145.
97. Id. at 142, 146-48.
98. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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tional scheme of the intestacy statute. Repeal of the advancements
statutes requires a legislative judgment that an intestate decedent
who makes lifetime gifts to presumptive takers intends to adjust
the distributional scheme of the intestacy statute. More particu-
larly, it requires a legislative judgment that an intestate decedent
who makes a lifetime gift to a child intends to permit that child to
receive a greater portion of the decedent's wealth than any other
children. Given the strength of the empirical data supporting the
distributional schemes found in the majority of intestate succes-
sion statutes, especially with respect to children and lineal de-
scendants, 99 a decision to repeal the advancements doctrine seems
counterintuitive. Even if a legislature were convinced that by mak-
ing a lifetime gift the decedent intended to reject the intestacy
scheme, it should nevertheless continue the advancements doctrine
for lifetime gifts for which the decedent retains significant rights
and interests. For these types of transfers, will substitutes, in
which the decedent essentially retains ownership until death, the
decedent is not likely to comprehend the difference between pro-
bate and nonprobate transfers or that both types of transfers
would not be considered when distributing the property among the
heirs. Will substitutes are not only a reason for not repealing ex-
isting advancements statutes, their growing popularity among per-
sons of modest wealth provides a reason for reforming these
statutes.100
The UPC statute fails because the drafters turned a viable
doctrine into an anachronism by adopting a nineteenth century
model without evaluating that model in terms of social and eco-
nomic developments. The question that remains outstanding is
whether a statute can be designed that reflects the probable intent
of decedents to make advancements and yet does not require heirs
to engage in extensive litigation to enforce their rights.
An advancements statute could be designed to require that the
distribution of a decedent's estate take into account all gifts to lin-
eal descendants of substantial sums not given for maintenance or
education of the donee. The decedent's heirs who are not lineal
descendants should not be subject to this proposed advancements
statute because the decedent's intent regarding lifetime gifts to
these heirs is less certain. Upon proof to the probate court of a
99. See Fellows, Simon, & Rau, supra note 8, at 368-84.
100. The following table demonstrates the growing popularity of two of the most fre-
quently used will substitutes, life insurance and jointly owned property with right of survi-
vorship, for those persons dying with relatively small estates.
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significant lifetime gift, the court could make adjustments in the
shares of the estate going to each lineal descendant without further
inquiry into the decedent's intent. 011 This proposal reflects the En-
glish courts' apparent interpretation of the Statute of Distribu-
tion,10 2 which treated all gifts made during the life of the decedent
as advancements except gifts of small sums or gifts made for the
purpose of maintenance or in satisfaction of the decedent's support
obligation. Proof of whether a gift fell within one of the exceptions
to the rule rested on objective evidence of the nature or purpose of
the gift. 08 This proposal also corresponds to the rule adopted in
Life Insurance and Jointly Owned Property With
Right of Survivorship as a Percentage of the
Decedent's Gross Estate
Estate Tax Returns Filed in
1973 1977
Size of Jointly Jointly
Gross Estate Life Owned Life Owned
Insurance Property Insurance Property
$ 60,000 under $ 70,000 7.3 27.6 7.8 29.1
$ 70,000 under $ 80,000 8.2 28.9 8.1 30.1
$ 80,000 under $ 90,000 8.5 31.3 8.8 32.6
$ 90,000 under $100,000 8.3 29.8 9.4 31.9
$100,000 under $120,000 9.2 30.3 9.4 34.0
$120,000 under $150,000 9.1 29.1 9.1 31.5
$150,000 under $200,000 8.1 24.9 8.3 29.0
$200,000 under $300,000 7.1 20.0 7.2 24.3
All estates 5.5 16.5 5.6 18.7
See STATInCS OF INcom--1972, ESTATE TAx RETURNS 12, 13, 15 (1974); STATISCS OF IN-
coun--1976, ESTATE TAx RETuRNs 15, 16, 19 (1979); see also Stein, Probate Administration
Study: Some Emerging Conclusions, 9 RAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 596, 599 (1974).
101. An exception to this proposed rule could be allowed if clear and convincing evi-
dence demonstrates decedents intent not to make an advancement. The exception could be
limited to written evidence. Admittedly, this type of exception would not be consistent with
the normal operation of the intestate succession statute, see supra notes 88-92 and accom-
panying text, but it is attractive, nevertheless, because it provides further opportunities for
the decedent to establish donative intent.
A legislature would be justified in restricting the application of the proposed advance-
ments rule to lifetime transfers made by will substitutes. See supra note 85 and accompany-
ing text.
102. English Statute of Distribution, 22 & 23 Car. II, ch. 10, § 3 (1670), quoted supra
note 19.
103. In Boyd v. Boyd, 4 L.R.-Eq. 305 (1867), the court stated:
[W]herever a sum is paid for a particular purpose, which is thought good and right by
the father, and which the son himself desires, if it be money which is drawn out in
considerable amount, and not a small sum, it must be treated as an advance. The pay-
ment of the money is the important thing-the Court does not look to the application.
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South Carolina in the nineteenth century. 104
This proposal serves two principal functions. First, it assures
administrative efficiency and fairness without burdening heirs with
the costs of litigation or unfamiliar formalities. Second, it brings
the advancements doctrine into conformity with the general law of
succession. °5 A court's inquiry into a decedent's actual intent with
Id. at 308-09; see also In re Blockley, 29 Ch. D. 250, 253 (1885) (finding an advancement by
the father to the son of a certain amount of money); Elbert, Advancements: II, supra note
4, at 232-33 (examining old English cases that regarded the intent of the advancer as imma-
terial). Despite the strong language of Boyd, the purpose of the gift seems to have been
relevant to the court in deciding whether the decedent had made an advancement. Perhaps
the best articulation of the "no specific intent" interpretation of the English advancements
statute is found in the following excerpt from Sir Jessels' opinion in Taylor v.Taylor, 20
L.R.-Eq. 155, 157-58 (1875):
I have always understood that an advancement by way of portion is something given by
the parent to establish the child in life, or to make what is called a provision for
him-not a mere casual payment of this kind. You may make the provision by way of
marriage portion on the marriage of the child. You may make it on putting him into a
profession or business in a variety of ways: you may pay for a commission, you may buy
him the goodwill of a business and give him stock-in-trade; all these things I under-
stand to be portions or provisions. Again, if in the absence of evidence you find a father
giving a large sum to a child in one payment, there is a presumption that that is in-
tended to start him in life or make a provision for him; but if a small sum is so given
you may require evidence to shew the purpose. But I do not think that these words "by
portion" are to be disregarded, nor is the word "advancement" to be disregarded. It is
not every payment made to a child which is to be regarded as an advancement, or
advancement by way of portion. In every case to which I have been referred there has
either been a settlement itself, or the purpose for which the payment was made has
been shewn to be that which every one would recognize as being for establishing the
child or making a provision for the child.
Id.; see also Kircudbright v. Kircudbright, 8 Ves. Jun. 51, 32 Eng. Rep. 269 (1802).
104. See supra note 21; see also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.140(1) (Bobbs-Merrill
1972). The Kentucky statute provides:
Any real or personal property or money, given or devised by a parent or grandpar-
ent to a descendant, shall be charged to the descendant or those claiming through him
in the division and distribution of the undevised estate of the parent or grandpar-
ent.... The maintaining or educating or the giving of money, to a child or grandchild,
without any view to a portion or settlement in life, shall not be deemed an
advancement.
Id.
When the proviso relating to maintenance, education, and gifts of money is inapplica-
ble, the Kentucky courts have held that the statute requires the decedent's intent to be
ignored. Thomas v. Thomas, 398 S.W.2d 231 (Ky. 1965); Remmele v. Kinstler, 298 S.W.2d
680 (Ky. 1957); Gossage v. Gossage's Adm'r, 281 Ky. 575, 136 S.W.2d 775 (1940); Ecton v.
Flynn, 229 Ky. 476, 17 S.W.2d 407 (1929); Isgrigg v. Isgrigg, 179 Ky. 260, 200 S.W. 478
(1918); Boblett v. Barlow, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1076, 83 S.W. 145 (1904); Bowles v. Winchester, 76
Ky. (13 Bush) 1 (1877). If the proviso applies, the statute expressly provides intent is rele-
vant. Popplewell v. Flanagan, 244 S.W.2d 445 (Ky. 1951); Chism v. Chism, 296 Ky. 73, 176
S.W.2d 101 (1943); Crain v. Malone, 130 Ky. 125, 113 S.W. 67 (1908); Hill's Guardian v.
Hill, 122 Ky. 681, 92 S.W. 924 (1906).
105.
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respect to a gift, even if the evidence is restricted to writings, is
inappropriate. The intestacy statute creates rules of law, designed
to reflect the decedent's probable intent, that are independent of
an individual's peculiar circumstances. The advancements doc-
trine, as part of that statutory estate plan, should be merely an
extension of the principle underlying that statutory plan-the fur-
therance of the decedent's probable intent to treat children or
their families equally. The risk that some gifts could be treated as
advancements contrary to the decedent's actual intention is similar
to other risks of not accomplishing a particular decedent's actual
wishes through the statutory scheme. The inflexibility of the intes-
tate succession statute is a matter open to debate.106 England and
some Commonwealth nations 0 7 have introduced court discretion
and flexibility into their intestate succession statutes, but the
United States generally has rejected this type of statutory scheme
because of a fear of increased administrative difficulties and pro-
bate expenses.108 The general rule adopted throughout the United
States is that the decedent should be able to vary the intestate
It may be argued that the recognition of an advancement is illogical in that we ordina-
rily require the formalities of a will to accomplish a variation in the course of intestate
succession, because of the danger of fraud and misunderstanding. Yet in the case of the
advancement such a variation may be accomplished orally. Doubtless, the justification
for a doctrine of advancements is that people will attempt such transactions whether
the statutes provide for them or not, and if no provision for them is made, the intent of
donors will often be frustrated. Moreover, the overt act of transferring title by way of
advancement is somewhat less likely to be susceptible to fraud or misunderstanding
than the execution of an oral will.
M.P.C. 1 29, Comment (1946). Conceivably, this apparent inconsistency could be rational-
ized on the basis that lifetime gifts are so ambiguous that inquiry into intent on a case by
case basis is necessary. The difficulty with this argument is that other intestate succession
issues are equally as ambiguous, which is why the trend toward flexibility in the Common-
wealth nations developed. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
106. See Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modem Wills Act, 31 U. MIAI L. REv. 497,
557-60 (1977); see also Friedman, supra note 8, at 9, 20.
107. E.g., England's Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act, 1975, ch.
63; Family Protection Act 1955, 2 N.Z. Rpn. STAT. 449-60.
108. But see LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2432, 2434-35, 2437 (West Supp. 1984) (if either
spouse dies "rich" leaving the surviving spouse in "necessitous circumstances," the latter
has the right to one-fourth of the decedent's estate if no children survive, but if one, two, or
three children survive, the spouse has the right to one-fourth in usufruct only, and if more
than three children survive, the spouse shall receive only a child's share in usufruct); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 401 (1958) (the surviving spouse of a decedent shall receive from an
intestate decedent's estate that part of the personalty owned by the decedent that the pro-
bate court assigns according to the surviving spouse's circumstances and the "estate and
degree" of the decedent; but the share of personalty shall not be less than one-third after
payment of claims against the estate). Of course, the advancements statutes themselves are
another counter-example of the American exclusion of discretion and flexibility in rule-
making.
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succession statute only by executing a valid will. Analogously, to
avoid having the law treat a gift as an advancement, the decedent
should have to execute a will and not merely declare orally or by a
nontestamentary writing that the gift was not intended as an
advancement. 109
The proposed statutory reform for advancements developed
from two research paths. First, a review of current case law de-
109. This proposal should not be extended to satisfactions. Using a subjective stan-
dard of intent rather than adopting an objective test is not theoretically unsound for satis-
factions because the evidence is used to vary language in a will rather than an intestate
succession statute. The law of wills contains many doctrines which authorize courts to admit
extrinsic evidence to discover and give effect to the testator's intent. The ambiguity doctrine
authorizes the admission of extrinsic evidence to clarify the testator's intended meaning and
to disregard parts of a will in order to accomplish the testator's intent. See, e.g., Patch v.
White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886); see also Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 7, at 529-35. In the
"sham will" cases courts have admitted testator's declarations to prove that the testator did
not intend to execute a will that otherwise appears valid in its execution. See, e.g., Fleming
v. Morrison, 187 Mass. 120, 72 N.E. 499 (1904); see also Langbein & Waggoner, supra note
7, at 541-43. The doctrine of dependent relative revocation permits courts to rely on extrin-
sic evidence to imply a condition that defeats the testator's unequivocal revocation. See,
e.g., Estate of Callahan, 251 Wis. 247, 29 N.W.2d 352 (1947); see also Langbein & Waggoner,
supra note 7, at 543-45. These doctrines, along with other similar doctrines, indicate that
the will execution statute has not significantly impaired a court's ability to implement the
testator's intent when proved clearly and convincingly. So long as lawyers can articulate a
doctrine to indicate technical adherence to the will execution statute, the courts are pre-
pared to admit extrinsic evidence and provide a remedy. In sum, inquiry into the specific
intent of the testator is standard procedure for courts asked to give effect to a will because
they recognize that the basic goal of the law of wills is to achieve the testator's intent. See
generally Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 7. The satisfactions doctrine is one of many
theories adopted by courts to reconcile their inquiry into testators' intent with the will exe-
cution statutes, which seemingly require the impossible-that all expressions of a testator's
intent be executed with the requisite will formalities. The courts' reliance on a number of
technical doctrines rather than a general rule providing that language in a will can be ig-
nored or changed in order to accomplish a testator's intent that is proved clearly and con-
vincingly by extrinsic evidence exemplifies the deceptive reasoning that lawyers frequently
find in case opinions when courts try to achieve fair and just results while paying homage to
precedents and statutes.
Despite theoretical basis in the law, the courts' inquiry into the testator's intent with
respect to lifetime gifts has resulted in satisfactions litigation involving difficult factual dis-
putes. See, e.g., Kapiolani Maternity & Gynecological Hosp. v. Wodehouse, 70 F.2d 793 (9th
Cir. 1934); Kramer v. Kramer, 201 F. 248 (5th Cir. 1912); Hart v. Johnson, 81 Ga. 734, 8 S.E.
73 (1888); Cull v. Cull, 42 Ga. App. 626, 157 S.E. 124 (1931); Threw v. Threw, 410 1Il. 107,
101 N.E.2d 515 (1951); In re Estate of Pridmore, 187 l. App. 301 (1914); State v. Crossley,
69 Ind. 203 (1879); In re Estate of Smith, 210 Iowa 563, 231 N.W. 468 (1930); Duncan's
Trustee v. Clay, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 48 (1877); Richards v. Humphreys, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.)
133 (1833); In re Vincent's Estate, 241 Mich. 329, 217 N.W. 65 (1928); Lake v. Harrington,
210 Miss. 74, 48 So.2d 845 (1950); Degraaf v. Teerpenning, 52 How. Pr. 313 (N.Y. 1876);
Grogan v. Ashe, 156 N.C. 286, 72 S.E. 372 (1911); Gibson v. Buis, 142 Tenn. 133, 218 S.W.
220 (1919); Harrison's Ex'r v. Harrison's Adm'r, 171 Va. 224, 198 S.E. 902 (1938); Jones v.
Mason, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 577 (1827); In re Estate of Groves, 120 W. Va. 373, 198 S.E. 142
(1938); Will of Cramer, 183 Wis. 525, 198 N.W. 386 (1924).
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cided under various types of advancements and satisfactions stat-
utes suggested the nature of the problem.11 Second, review of
early English and American case law offered the solution."' The
proposal's development, however, indicates the complexity of the
law reformers' task to avoid falling victim to the common-law tra-
dition of following convoluted paths to achieve legal change. Pro-
fessor Rodell ridicules legal thinking by comparing the lawyer to a
killy-loo bird who flies backward. 12 The answer, contrary to what
Professor Rodell may be suggesting, however, is not to avoid look-
ing back. The key to eliminating needless complexity in the law
caused by deceptive linguistic techniques is for lawmakers to iden-
tify societal changes and other legal developments that may make
old rules unacceptable or nonresponsive. The UPC drafters cer-
tainly were not incorrect in searching for a model for their ad-
vancements statute in nineteenth century reforms. Perhaps their
error was the failure to inquire further into the cases decided
under these nineteenth century statutes to evaluate the potential
effect on the advancements doctrine of requiring proof of intent to
make an advancement to be in writing. No easy tests or foolproof
techniques are readily indentifiable for drafters of legislation to
avoid being caught by their own legal linguistic traps. Perpetuation
of old rules, doctrines, and institutions with slight modification
may lead, in many cases, to constructive reform. The critical prob-
lem for lawmakers is to predict when a proposed modification so
substantially changes the old rule that the law would be improved
by abandoning the familiar language of the old rule to signify the
legislature's adoption of a new direction in the law.
110. See supra notes 13-14, 45 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 21, 103-04 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 66.
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